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History

Douglas MacArthur's Occupation of Japan: Building the Foundation of U.S.-Japan
Relationship
Chairperson: Michael S. Mayer
The United States occupied Japan for seven years immediately after the World War
II. Designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas
MacArthur directed the occupation mission with absolute authority. The primary
purpose of the occupation was to disarm Japan and to punish the war criminals so that
Japan would never again be a menace to the Allied countries. However, through the
research mainly from MacArthur Papers of the MacArthur Memorial, William
Manchester's American Caesar, and Embracing Defeat by John Dower, it was found
that the humanitarian activities of the American occupation troops and MacArthur's
democratization programs saved the millions of Japanese people's lives. MacArthur's
wisdom in taking Japanese people's sentiments into account in every decision he
made also helped the occupation mission proceed smoothly and successfully.
Although the occupation began as a consequence of defeat in war, it helped to
rebuild the nation from devastation. MacArthur reformed the economic structure to
encourage the Japanese economy to be self-sufficient, gave food aid for the Japanese
suffering from hunger, and liberated them from their slavery status in their feudalistic
social system. One of MacArthur's great achievements was revising the Japanese
constitution by adopting the American executive system and British parliamentary
system. The new constitution liberated women and gave them equal status to men,
liberated the education system, and renounced war. After sixty years, this constitution
has never been amended.
Within a few years, Japanese economy rebounded, and industry grew rapidly in
response to the Korean War. The occupation ended with the San Francisco Peace
Treaty in 1952, and the Allied countries gave Japan sovereignty. Even though the
people of the two countries fought a brutal war in the Pacific, the United States and
Japan established a strong tie during the seven years of occupation. Japan emerged
from the occupation a strong ally of the United States. Thus, the relationship between
the U.S. and Japan, which remains strong and influential, is the great legacy of
Douglas MacArthur.
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Introduction

Japan is one of the most advanced countries in the world—the second largest
economy after the United States, measured on an exchange rate basis.' It achieved
remarkably rapid success after losing a war with devastating damage. However, one
cannot forget the fact that the United States played a significant role in Japan's
postwar recovery. It would not have been possible without the aid of the United States
and General Douglas MacArthur's guidance during the seven years of occupation
after the World War II.
Historians have credited MacArthur with the creation of a stable, democratic
government in Japan, with rebuilding its economy, with the modernization of its
society, with the liberation of its women, and with forging a close relationship
between Japan and the United States that has lasted to this day. Based in research in
MacArthur Papers, this thesis supports those general conclusions.
After Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the Allied countries, led by the
United States, occupied Japan for nearly seven years—longer than the actual war
between the U.S. and Japan—until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force on
April 28, 1952. Immediately following the surrender of Japan, American President
Harry Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers (SCAP). In that capacity, MacArthur directed the General
Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo and supervised the occupation programs in Japan.
Besides the primary aim of demobilization, one of the biggest missions for MacArthur
was to bring American democracy into a traditional, imperialistic country, in which
people worshipped the Emperor as a living God. The current status of Japan in the

1 CIA, The World Factbook,
http7/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html
1

modem world is a legacy of MacArthur's successful democratization, which includes
forming the foundation of rapid economic growth and modernization of the
constitution.
As the Supreme Commander, MacArthur had absolute authority over all
Japanese, even the government and the Emperor. He effectively used his power not
only to disarm the Imperial Army and punish the war criminals but also to help the
Japanese to recover from the aftermath of the war—poverty, starvation and despair.
Moreover, MacArthur supervised the writing of a new modem constitution, which
controversially renounced war and the possession of any military capacity other than
for self defense. Additionally, the new constitution granted women equal rights to men
for the first time in Japanese history.
The two main accounts of MacArthur's role in this transformation agree that
the General had a free hand in formulating policy for the occupation. As Dobbins
argues, MacArthur could largely ignore or maneuver around the supervisory
commissions.^ Dower points out the U.S. tendency to focus on the occupation of
Germany and the political situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also left
MacArthur with a freehand to make decisions.^ Indeed, on the day of Japanese
surrender. President Tmman declared that the authority of the Emperor and Japanese
Govemment to mle the state will be subject to MacArthur as a Supreme Commander."^
He actually took over the initiative of drafting the constitution when he found out that
the Japanese Govemment was incapable to propose revisions that he wanted.^
2 James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rohe Lai, Andrew
Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, Anga Timilsina, America's Role in Nation-BuildingFrom Germany to Iraq, California, Rand, 2003, p.29.
3 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat! Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York,
WW. Norton & Company, 1999, p.79.
Department of States, Occupation ofJapan^ Policy and Progress, Far Eastern Series
17, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.267, 1946, pp.88-89.
5 William Manchester, American Caesar- Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, New York,
2

Through all the reconstruction programs, the Japanese economy recovered
and got stronger within a few decades, and Japan was remodeled to be one of the most
loyal and supportive allies of the United States. Both Dower and Dobbins maintain
that Japan's postwar growth was made possible by MacArthur's work during the
occupation.^ That growth would never happened if the United States had not
supported the reconstruction of Japan after the war. Furthermore, the recovery would
not have been so dramatic without MacArthur's drastic reforms. MacArthur's tactics
enabled the occupation to succeed in a short period of time. Especially right after the
barbarous, brutal war in the Pacific, in which people of the both sides hated each other,
the success of the occupation of Japan was noteworthy. MacArthur's work made a
significant contribution in changing the attitudes of both the Americans and the
Japanese toward each other and accomplished to build a new relationship which still
remains strong.
In addition to MacArthur's wisdom in conducting the mission, historians
have noted several key conditions during the occupation of Japan that contributed to
its success: the Japanese culture that emphasized obedience to a divine ruler; the
desperate situation Japan found itself in immediately after the war; the practically sole
occupation by the United States, and absolute authority of MacArthur, as well as his
charismatic personality. All of them helped MacArthur make his mission successful.
Also, MacArthur's efforts to rebuild Japan moved the policy makers in Washington to
pay more attention to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, which became one of
the great national interests of the United States as the cold war developed.
Dower and Manchester have pointed to the significance of the unquestioned
obedience of the Japanese people to a divine ruler. Dower notes that the GHQ
Laurel Book, 1978, p.588.
® Dower, p. 551. J Dobbins, p.14.
3

instructed their officials about the Japanese people that they were trained to play
"follow-the-leader." ^ MacArthur's psychological-warfare adviser, Bonner Fellers
argued that Emperor worship of the Japanese people was one of the significant
aspects that the GHQ officials had to consider.^ MacArthur also noted, in his
reminiscences, that "This God-Emperor was absolute. His word was final.
Dower and Dobbins have noted that the devastation of Japan's industrial base,
the devastation of its cities, the scarcity of food, etc. provided MacArthur with
favorable conditions to reconstruct Japanese society. Dobbins argues that the U.S.
saved millions of the Japanese during the first

stage of the postwar years.

Manchester noted that the sanitation campaign by a Public-Health section saved 2.1
million Japanese lives." Without the humanitarian aid by the U.S., millions of
Japanese people would have died in starvation. Japanese nationals expressed their
appreciation by writing letters to MacArthur. 12 Through those activities in the initial
stage of the occupation, MacArthur successfully made a favorable impression on the
Japanese people and won their cooperation. That made the latter occupation go more
smoothly and quickly.
Finally, MacArthur's broad authority combined with his charismatic
personality to make him an ideal figure to head the occupation. His own imperial
bearing and style fit perfectly with the Japanese cultural tendency towards deference.
Historians such as Dower and Manchester have noted this. Their observations are
bom out by the Japanese people's practice of sending letters to MacArthur expressing

Dower, p.215.
8 Ibid., pp.283-284.

9 MacArthiu-, Reminiscences, pp.283-284.
10 Dobbins, p.37.
Manchester, p.601.
12 Rinjiro Sodei, Dear General MacArthur, Boston, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2001, p.123.
4

their gratitude and respects for him that proved that the Japanese nationals were
attracted by MacArthur's graciousness and charisma. 13
MacArthur had spent much of his adult life in Asia, and he thought he knew
Asians and, by extension, the Japanese. In fact, as Dower and Manchester have
pointed out, MacArthur's view of Asians was paternalistic and even racist. Dower
notes that MacArthur said "Asia was culturally and politically backward."
Moreover, MacArthur knew Asia in general, and the Philippines in particular, a good
deal better than Japan. At least initially, his understanding of Japan depended heavily
on briefing papers prepared for him when he got ready to assume his position as
commander of the occupation. Bonner Fellers, who wrote several of those papers,
gave MacArthur "a fifteen-point mantra" that explained Japanese behavior patterns.'^
MacArthur was a remarkably quick study, but his ability to absorb briefing papers did
not provide him with an in depth knowledge of Japan or its people. Further, while the
MacArthur Papers contain no instances of what, at least by the standards of the 1940s,
might considered outright racism, they do reveal elements of paternalism and racial
stereotyping typical of MacArthur's time and background. As Dower has pointed out,
to MacArthur, Japan was a backward country and the Japanese people needed to be
civilized with the idea of democracy.

In a speech he made when he returned to the

U.S., MacArthur said the Japanese "would be like a boy of twelve," and were in a
17
tuitionary condition, compared to "the Anglo-Saxon, [who] was 45 years of age."
When this statement became public, it diminished the respect and gratitude the
Japanese had for MacArthur.
13 Manchester, p.556.
14 Dower, p.286.
15
pp.283-284.
16 Ibid., p.213.

1'^ U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, May 1951, Part I, esp. p.312.
5

The seven years of occupation was a significant event for both Japan and the
United States because it served as the origin of the foundation of the current
U.S.-Japan relationship, which is very important in terms of security, economy, and
technology. When Japan regained the sovereignty by signing the San Francisco Peace
Treaty in 1951, the United States and Japan also signed a Mutual Security Assistance
Pact in which the two countries agreed to ensure continued U.S. access to the
American bases in Japan in retum for U.S. protection of Japan in the event Japan was
attacked. This treaty has been a significant pillar of the U.S.-Japan relationship ever
since, bonding the two countries together to maintain the security against threats in
the Asia-Pacific region.18
It is worthwhile to ponder MacArthur's role in Japan because his legacy is
still alive. For example, the Japanese have never amended the constitution that
MacArthur imposed, though the interpretation of Article 9 has been frequently
debated, and dissatisfaction among the Japanese with the American military presence
throughout Japan has been growing. Although sixty years have passed since the end of
the war and there are not very many survivors of that era alive any more, it is
important now to reconsider what people experienced during and after the war, and
what we have now because of the hard times they lived through. Thus, it is also a duty
of those who survived to tell the story of this significant period to subsequent
generations to help them understand the origins of what they have now and reconsider
the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

18 Wikipedia, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States
and Japan,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiyTreaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_t
he_United_States_and_Japan
6

1. The Aims of the Occupation

After the devastation of two cities by atomic bombs, the Japanese Imperial
Government finally agreed to surrender on August 10, 1945. Following Emperor
Hirohito's acceptance of the surrender, the Allies officially launched an occupation
program in Japan. The primary aim of the occupation was to disarm, demilitarize, and
democratize Japan to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the
United States or a threat to the peace and security of the world. The United States
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan stated their objectives:
The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan to
which policies in the initial period must conform are to insure that Japan will
not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security
of the world, and to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and
responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will
support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and
principles of the charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that
this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of
democratic self govemment but it is not the responsibility of the Allied
Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the
freely expressed will of the people.
President Harry Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on August 14, 1945, with the approval of
Clement Attlee of Britain, Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, and Chiang Kai-shek of
China. President Truman directed MacArthur that:
"From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and
Japanese Govemment to rule the state will be subject to you and you will
take such steps as you deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms. You
will exercise supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may
be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied
19 Douglas MacArthur, Reports of General MacArthur- Japanese Operations in the
Southwest Pacific Area, Vol.1, Supplement- MacArthur in Japan'- The Occupation,
Military Phase, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966, p.195.
7

Powers concerned."^®
Thus, MacArthur gained absolute authority over Japan. Even the Emperor and the
prime minister were subordinate to him, not to mention all Japanese citizens.
American officials made it clear that the Japanese were to take the initiatives
in governmental matters with the supervision of the Allied Powers. Since they
occupied Japan in order to build a democratic country, it was the official stance of the
Allies to respect the will of the Japanese people, and let them lead their own recovery
process. However, as soon as the Allies found out the existing political and
economical structures had collapsed, MacArthur assumed authority over these areas.^'
As the Supreme Commander, MacArthur pursued a number of objectives of
the occupation, including demilitarization, punishing war criminals, building the
structure of representative government, modernizing the constitution, holding free
elections, enfranchising women, releasing political prisoners, liberating the farmers,
establishing a free labor movement, encouraging a free economy, abolishing police
oppression, developing a free and responsible press, liberalizing education,
decentralizing political power, and separating religion from the state.^^ He intended
to transform a small, feudalistic country in Asia, into a modem, democratic country.
Within only two months, MacArthur reported on the achievements of initial
occupation objectives. Demobilization went unexpectedly smoothly and quickly
because of the cooperation by the Japanese government and submissive Japanese
nationals under the mandate of the Emperor to obey the occupation troops. In a radio
address to the American people on October 15, 1945, MacArthur declared the
20 Department of States, Occupation of Japan-' Policy and Progress, Far Eastern
Series 17, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.267, 1946,
pp.88-89.
21 WiUiam Manchester, American Caesar- Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, New York,
Laiu-el Book, 1978, p.588.
22 Douglas MacArthvir, Reminiscences, New York, McGrawHUl Book Company, 1964.
pp.282-283.
8

completion of the demobilization program. He proudly proclaimed that "Today, the
Japanese Armed Forces throughout Japan completed their demobilization and ceased
to exist as such. These forces are now completely abolished. I know of no
demobilization in history, either in war or in peace, by our own or by any other
country, that has been accomplished so rapidly or so frictionlessly. Everything military,
naval or air is forbidden in Japan."^^
Thus, the most important, urgent aim of the occupation was accomplished
surprisingly smoothly and quickly. All the democratization programs followed this in
the next seven years.

23 MacArthiir, Reports of General MacArthur, Vol.1. Supp. p.131., GHQ USAFPAC
Press Release, October 15, 1945.
9

2. The Structure of the Occupation

Administrative Structure

To accomplish the aims of the occupation, the

fmal terms proclaimed at the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, the Allies—the
United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union—agreed to a joint
occupation of Japan, once it surrendered. However, because of its predominant role in
the fmal stages of the war against Japan in the Pacific, the United States took the lead
in the occupation of Japan. Immediately, the United States planned to call for 600,000
troops and anticipated that this would include 315,000 American, 135,000 British
Commonwealth, 60,000 Chinese, and 175,000 Soviet troops, all under the U.S.
command. Yet, these numbers were later revised, and neither the Soviets nor the
Chinese ever contributed forces after all. So, in the end, only the countries of the
British Commonwealth shared occupation responsibilities with the United States by
providing with 45,000 troops.^'^
The United States agreed to form two international bodies for oversight of
GHQ—the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ).
Established in February of 1946, the FEC consisted of representatives from 11
countries that fought against Japan—Australia, Canada, China, France, India,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Its role was to formulate policies to enable Japan to fulfill its
surrender terms and to review MacArthur's directives and the actions of the
occupation forces. In fact, even though designed as a supervisory body, the FEC had
no effective power over making policy, because it was dominated by the United States,
China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Although the FEC had the power

24 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, New
York, The Free Press, 1987, p.60.
10

to override MacArthur on the issue of constitutional revision and exercised some
influence on the content of the final document, MacArthur could largely ignore or
maneuver around the commission.^^
Like the FEC, the ACJ was not an effective instrument. Composed of the
United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union, the ACJ was
established in April of 1946 to consult and advise GHQ. The ACJ could not function
effectively because MacArthur, whose representative served as the ACJ's chair, was
not obligated to consult with it or accept its advice, and in fact chose not to do so.
Thus, the occupation of Japan was actually conducted by the American officials.
Furthermore, the attention of American policy makers in Washington D.C. tended to
focus on the occupation of Germany and the political situation in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe in the postwar period. It thus left MacArthur with an unusually
freehand to make decisions regarding the occupation of Japan.^^ Ultimately, although
it was seen as the "Allied occupation," the United States effectively exercised
unilateral control over all the occupation process. In other words, it was MacArthur's
occupation.

How GHQ Functioned

MacArthur created a headquarters that was

responsible for nonmilitary matters, in particular the democratization of Japan. The
headquarters initially had nine sections, including the Government Section, the
Economic and Scientific Section, the Natural Resources Section, and the Civil
Information and Education Section. These were established to be roughly parallel in
structure to the Japanese cabinet, so they could make use of existent institution
efficiently with the guidance of GHQ officials. The GHQ staffs were mostly

25 Dobbins, p.29.
26 Dower, p.79.
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American civil servants and officers who converted to civilian status. At its peak in
1948, it employed nearly 3,500 people.
In August of 1945, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to establish
a liaison office to interact with GHQ. The Central Liaison Office was established in
Tokyo and staffed by the Foreign Ministry of Japan. Liaison offices were also set up
in each prefecture to serve local military government teams. The Central Liaison
Office functioned as the primary channel for communication between the special staff
sections of GHQ and the Japanese government so that the staff sections could
communicate directly with the Japanese ministries and agencies they oversaw.
As for security, MacArthur initially estimated he would need between
200,000 and 600,000 troops in the first six months of occupation to disarm and patrol
Japan. He ordered the occupation troops to arrive in Japan in two stages. Following
the Supreme Commander's landing on August 30, the main forces of the U.S. Eighth
Army, led by General Robert Eichelberger, began coming ashore on September 1 and
rapidly took up positions in the northern half of the country, from Nagoya to
Hokkaido. On September 4, the Sixth Army began to arrive at the naval port of
Sasebo and assumed positions at former Japanese military bases in the southern half
of the country, led by General Walter Krueger. At the end of 1945, approximately
354,675 U.S. troops were stationed throughout Japan.^^

Food and Public Health

Japan had been severely damaged by daily

bombing raids by the Allies, and people suffered from hunger and material shortages,
particularly housing. Food and supplies such as clothing and medicines from the
United States saved millions of the Japanese during the first stage of the postwar
2'^ Dobbins, p.32.
28 U.S. War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, Machine Records Branch,
Washington, D.C., December 1, 1945. in Dobbins' America's Role in Nation-Building.
12

years.29
The food shortage was exacerbated by the fact that Japan, which was
overpopulated and had Hmited arable land, had largely depended on imported food.
Japan used to import basic food like rice and sugar from Korea, Formosa (Taiwan),
and China. Imports accounted for 31 percent of Japan's rice consumption, 92 percent
of its sugar, 58 percent of its soy beans, and 45 percent of its salt.

on

During the war,

Japan squeezed food from the nations it occupied, especially from Korea. As a result,
Korea suffered from starvation. The Japanese used Korea as a "bread basket" and
Formosa as a "sugar bowl."^"
However, with the outbreak of the war against the Allies in the Pacific,
Japanese lines of trade were blocked by the Allied countries, creating shortages of
food and raw materials which were essential for fighting a war. The shortage of
supplies was one of the main reasons for Japan's defeat. Possessed of a strong
militaristic spirit, Japanese soldiers were still eager to fight to the end of their lives,
but, physically, it was impossible for them to keep fighting any longer. Starvation
became a major cause of death among Japanese soldiers. On the home front as well,
the Japanese people suffered from malnutrition and starvation. Crime rates were
noticeably higher in the first post suirender years than ever before, because of hunger
and material shortages, people committed robbery and theft all over Japan. The yearly
average for arrests counted 9,485 for robbery and 1,177,184 for theft in the period
between 1946 and 1949.^^
In 1945, food supplies were severely limited worldwide, not only in Japan.
The U.S. Air Force began dropping relief supplies of food, medicines, and clothing
29
30
31
32

Dobbins, p.37.
Dower, p.91.
MacArthur Papers, The MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia, RG-5, Reel #25.
Dower, p.109.
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over the camps that held Allied prisoners in Japan as early as August 25, even before
the occupation troops started landing. However, feeding the Japanese, the former
enemy, was a low priority for the Allies. The White House ordered MacArthur to limit
Japanese food relief to what was needed to prevent a level of disease and unrest that
could endanger the occupation forces and interfere with GHQ operations. Imports of
fuel and medicines were also kept at subsistence levels. Opposing this order of the
government, MacArthur insisted that Japan must get back on its feet, with the
standard of living of 1926 to 1930—a peaceful, non-militaristic period in Japan. To
avoid possible chaos and opposition to the occupation programs stemming from
hunger and material shortages, the General asked the U.S. Government to give more
money for the food relief or more forces. "Give me bread or give me bullets," he
demanded.^^ His budget request of 1946-47 included $250 million for food, fertilizer,
petroleum products, and medicines, and, indeed, he got it.^"*
Occupation troops were forbidden to consume local food or supplies; they
would eat only their own rations. The Japanese were surprised because they never
thought the enemy would help them out; instead they thought the Allied troops would
take away their food and scarce supplies just like their own troops did in countries the
Japanese had occupied. MacArthur said, "The first step in the reformation of Japan
would be an exhibition of generosity and compassion by the occupying p o w e r . T h e
attitude was evident on street comers, where children were soon playing and running
around American soldiers who gave away chocolates and chewing gum from the jeeps.
It did not take long for kids to learn a phrase of English "Give me chocolate!"^^
Besides providing food aid, MacArthur created a Public-Health section
33
34
35
36

Manchester, p.544.; MacArthur, Reminiscences, p.307.
Dobbins, p.37.
Manchester, p.524.
Dower, p.110.
14

headed by an army physician. Dr. Crawford Sams. Sams conducted a national
sanitation campaign, followed by a massive immunization and vaccination program.
At the end of the campaign, cholera had been wiped out; deaths from tuberculosis
were down by 88 percent, from diphtheria by 86 percent, from dysentery by 86
percent, and from typhoid by 90 percent. In the first years of the occupation, Sams
estimated, the control of communicable diseases alone had saved 2.1 million Japanese
lives—more than the country's battle deaths during the war, and over three times the
number of Japanese civilians killed in the wartime bombings including Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Thanks to the nation-wide sanitation campaign, the life expectancy of
Japanese men increased by eight years and of women by nearly fourteen years. The
Public-Health section also instructed schools to teach proper dietary principles and
served pupils balanced meals.^^
In addition to the aid from the occupation troops, Japan received huge
amount of financial help from the United States Government. This included $1.6
billion of aid from Government Appropriation for Relief In Occupied Area
(GARIOA), which provided civilians of the occupied countries with financial aid by
the U.S. Ministry of Army for the use of medicine and food; $200 million from
Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area (EROA) which was to help them obtain
raw materials such as coal or mine, in order to support economic and industrial
rehabilitation of the occupied countries.38 Japanese residents in the United States also
sent food gifts to Japan through Licensed Agencies for Relief of Asia (LARA). The
food aid from the U.S. saved more than 11 million Japanese from malnutrition and
possible starvation during the hardest time of the postwar.^^

3'^ Manchester, p.601.
38 http-//ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAR10A; httpV/ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/EROA
39 MacArthur Papers, SCAP, Food Report, 1946, RG-25, Reel #960.
15

Through this humanitarian assistance, MacArthur won appreciation of the
Japanese people and gave them a highly favorable initial impression of the occupation
forces. The occupation started effectively through this humanitarian work and helped
subsequent democratization programs proceed smoothly.

16

3. Japanese Reaction after the War

Towards the Surrender

The people of Japan were filled with mixed

feelings of grief, despair, and disillusionment at the nation's defeat. Some had anger
against the militaristic leaders for losing the war and others against themselves for
failing in the war effort. In addition, some had a feeling of intense sympathy for the
Emperor Hirohito."*^
Not until the beginning of Tokyo Tribunal did most of the Japanese people
know anything about the barbarous atrocities conducted by Japanese soldiers in areas
they conquered, such as the Philippines and China. When they heard the detailed
report of the truth for the first time at the opening of the trial, Japanese people were
shocked. Then, intellectuals began criticizing the militaristic leaders and government
officials for oppressing the people with nationalistic propaganda. Intellectuals also
began blaming themselves for being too weak and blind to authority. They argued that
the Japanese public lacked the courage to oppose or fight against oppression, and that
the majority of Japanese, deceived by the militaristic leaders, had to bear
responsibility for "having been stupid." They also blamed themselves, arguing that
"the leaders alone could not have fought such a large-scale war; we were manipulated,
and went along into a wrongful war of aggression, and invited miserable defeat. The
crime is not that of the leaders alone, but rather all of us must bear responsibility."^^
The Japanese press also felt ashamed for failing to disclose the nation's
barbarism abroad. A column of a newspaper noted that "It is shameful that not one
line of truth was reported in the papers."^^ The Imperial Government controlled
media coverage and suppressed the expression of political thought against the
40 yiacAxthw:, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.2, Part 11.^.
Dower, p.505.
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government. The people were made to believe that the war was for the Emperor and
preservation of their holy country. Thus, they knew nothing about what was really
going on, did not know what they were fighting for, and remained ignorant of what
the war was like. They were even told that Japan was winning until shortly before its
surrender. Therefore, Japanese citizens experienced profound shock at the news of
their country's surrender."^^

From Fear to Trust

Initially, Japanese people were afraid to have the

occupation troops come to their land. As the nationals of a defeated country, they had
no choice but to obey the new authority of the Allied officials, but they were afraid.
Various rumors and gossip circulated about the occupation, such as "American
soldiers would loot Japan," "Americans would rob Japan of all the food," "Women
and girls would be violated," "All men would be killed," "What was left of Tokyo
would be devastated."'^
However, being submissive to authority by nature, Japanese public welcomed
the occupation troops by saluting and bowing at their arrival, which surprised the
conquerors. Although women and children ran into hiding, there was no sign of civil
disturbance or resistance against the occupation troops. MacArthur recalled that on
the day GHQ moved from Yokohama to their new headquarters "Dai Ichi Building" in
Tokyo, the convoy seemed more like a triumphant parade of troops returning home to
receive the victor's plaudits. The Japanese along the road waved, shouted, bowed, and
saluted.'*^
While they were interacting with the occupation troops, the Japanese public
gradually became to trust and appreciate their activities in Japan. Contrary to the prior
43 Dower, p.505.
Tokyo Yomiuri, Tokyo Shimbun, August 19, 1945
45 MacArthur, Report of General MacArthur, Vol. 1, Supp. p.31.
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rumors and gossip, the unexpected friendliness, kindness, and generosity of American
soldiers impressed the Japanese population.'*'' The Japanese especially appreciated
MacArthur's order at the beginning of the occupation that the Imperial palace,
temples, shrines, and historical art objects were off limits to the occupation troops.
Initially, the U.S. planned to use the bodies of the Japanese war criminals for post
mortem brain research by the U.S. Army to investigate the correlation of pathological
or abnormal behavior with certain disease states or processes."*^ But MacArthur also
countermanded it, msisting that using "the similar methods by the Germans,"48 would
unquestionably shock public opinion not only in Japan, but also back home.
Considering the psychology of Japanese people, MacArthur insisted at every
occasion that the occupation troops should leam from the Japanese as well as teach
them. He considered the occupation troops as "ambassadors of good will." He later
recalled this approach "had a great deal to do with restoring a sense of dignity and
purpose in Japanese people, and as they regained self-respect and pride, they
approached an exchange of ideas with avidity and good will. This mutual respect
became the foundation of the basic esteem our two peoples came to have for one
another—and enabled the occupation to write a unique and warmly human chapter of
world history.That attitude of the General and his troops appealed to the "face
saving" tradition of the Japanese.^^ Even though Japan was initially a veiy foreign
country to MacArthur, he had a strong belief in the people of Japan and felt that if
American troops treated them with respect, they would respond with respect and trust

Nippon Times, September 4, 1945, Tokyo Shimbun, September 11, 1945.
47 MacArthur Papers, radiogram dated March 10, 1946, RG-9, Reel#324, radiogram
between Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC) and
U.S. Army.
48 Ibid., March 14, 1946.
49 MacArthxir, Reminiscences, p.283.
50 MacArthiir, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.1, Supp. p.51.
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and obey the occupation authorities. With his analysis supported by his advisers such
as Bonner Fellers, who specialized in Japanese people's psychology, MacArthur
ordered his troops to treat the Japanese with respect, even though they were former
enemies. The old authoritarian background of the Japanese contrasted with the free,
liberal philosophy of the American forces. Adjustments had to be made and
sometimes led to misunderstanding and confusion. However, because of the eagerness
of the Japanese to adapt themselves to occidental methods and recover during the
war's aftermath, MacArthur later noted that "the adjustment proved far less difficult
than had been anticipated."^'
MacArthur's effective attempts to respond to the Japanese psychic, with
useful suggestions by Fellers, helped to sustain mutual respect and trust between the
Japanese and the occupation forces after the onset of the occupation. On the third
anniversary of the end of the war, Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida declared that
Japanese people saw hope in the future of their country and expressed gratitude to the
occupation work. "While our living is not by any means easy, it is steadily
improving... This situation has been made possible by the combined efforts of all the
Japanese people. At the same time, we must never forget the thorough and painstaking
guidance and colossal material aid of the Allied powers."^^
The other reason Japanese nationals received the victors submissively was
they were ordered to do so by the Emperor. His word was absolute for Japanese
citizens, "his loyal subjects." Long imbued with a belief he was divine, they loyally
obeyed the Emperor's directions that the Japanese people must obey the terms of
surrender and must work toward regaining the trust and faith of the world by

51 Ibid., p.49.
52 Ibid., p.22.
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"enduring the unendurable, bearing the unbearable."^^ The Emperor's admonition
was part of an imperial rescript issued on the day of surrender, August 15, 1945. It
was broadcast nationwide by radio, and the Japanese citizens heard him speak for the
first time.^''
To our good and loyal subjects,
We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments
of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our
Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that
has been done by everyone...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned
against her interest.
The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected
hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings
of all of you. Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time
and fate that WE have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the
generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is
unsufferable [sic].
Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial
State, We are always with you. Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon
your sincerity and integrity.
Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender
needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may
create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the
world.
Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to
generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its sacred land, and
mindful of its heavy burden of responsibility and of the long road before it.
Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future.
Cultivate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spirit, and work with
resolution—so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State

53 Japanese Imperial Rescript, August 15, 1945, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
S'* Robert Harvey, American Shogun- GeneralMacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the
Drama of Modern Japan, New York, The Overlook Press, 2006, p.292.
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and keep pace with the progress of the world.^^
Hirohito called for calmness, self-discipHne, and assistance to the families of
soldiers as well as others who suffered as a result of the war.^^ Despite the shock and
despair that accompanied learning of the nation's defeat, Japanese people accepted the
fact without riots or disorder, and obeyed the directives of the Emperor to obey the
new ruler.
As the trust in MacArthur and his troops deepened, Japanese people began to
admire them as saviors. They said the GHQ liberated them from death, and the
occupation was a relief from despair and exhaustion. The food shipments from the
Americans were, for them, like "merciful rain during a drought."^' Many of Japanese
nationals wrote letters to MacArthur at the GHQ to express their feelings of gratitude
and respect.

CO

Prime ministers showed their gratitudes on every anniversary of the

day the war ended. The Liberal Party made a statement on August 15, 1946
expressing the appreciation toward the Allied powers "for their generous relief
measures extended in the present food crisis."^® Thus, Japanese people became to
think that the Supreme Commander was admirable, and so was democracy.

MacArthur Fever

MacArthur received respect from the Japanese people like

that accorded to the Emperor. Because the Emperor had been considered divine, the
citizens were not even allowed to look at him. They had never heard him speak until
they heard the surrender announcement over the radio on August 15. On the other
hand, people could actually see MacArthur and listen to him speak on a regular basis.

55 ImperialBesciipt on Surrender, August 15, 1945.
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He was for real. In fact, during the occupation period, MacArthur was the most
popular man in Japan. His strong image and absolute authority appealed to a Japanese
people in despair. They wanted a new, strong leader to rely on and to follow. People
even joked that if a man was dominated by a strong-minded wife, his neighbor would
say "Too bad, she's a MacArthur."^^ MacArthur attracted Japanese people with his
"electrifying presence."

To the Japanese, he was handsome, tall, bold, confident,

and he had personal aura and charisma. Some of Christian Japanese, after Hirohito
renounced his divinity, looked to MacArthur as the "second Jesus Christ." There were
even rumors that he had royal blood, that he was descended from Japanese ancestors,
and that he had a Nisei daughter. Some East Asian specialists were afraid his
monocracy might undermine the concept of democratization and self-rule, but others
believed that the General's "imperious aloofness and lordly graciousness" established
the prestige of the occupation.^^ In truth, his personal characteristics fit perfectly with
what the Japanese wanted in a leader.

Letters to the GHQ

One measure of the success of the occupation was the flood

of letters and gifts the Japanese people sent the General and his staff of the GHQ to
show their gratitude. About 500,000 letters were counted in the seven years of the
occupation period. A section called Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS)
took charge of translating letters written in Japanese, and they analyzed, and classified
them. The cover of the ATIS file stated that:
The advent of the Allied Occupation of Japan in August 1945 offered the
Japanese people the new freedom of thought and expression of opinion
without fear of governmental retaliation. This new freedom was manifested
in vast volumes of letters from the people to SCAP. The analysis contains an
60 Manchester, p.556.
61 Sodei, p.5.
62 Manchester, p.556.
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accurate insight on current political, economic and sociological opinions of
the Japanese people.^^
The ATIS forwarded letters directly to MacArthur and, according to
occupation veterans who served in the ATIS, MacArthur read every letter that was
addressed to him personally, and every writer who enclosed the address received a
, 64
reply.

Most of the letters showed their support for the policies of the occupation and
gratitude for benevolent work of the occupation forces in Japan. Some complained
that the police were too weak, corrupt and discourteous and asked for improvement.
Others asked for the early conclusion of a peace treaty, arguing that if the Allies
stayed too long, Japan would become too dependent on the United States. But at the
same time, there were those who were afraid of losing MacArthur's guidance. One
writer, fearing the expansion of communism, requested that the Occupation Forces
remain in Japan after the signing of the peace treaty until Japan became able to take
care of itself. Many requested permission to emigrate to the United States "the land of
freedom and individual rights." Surprisingly, some even asked the General to annex
Japan or turn it into a permanent colony of the United States.^^
In addition to letters, people sent numerous gifts to the GHQ. The Americans
were surprised by the Japanese traditional practice of gift giving. In spite of losing
their possessions during the war, there was no end to the number of people sending
gifts of thanks to MacArthur and his staffs. They received kimonos, sashes, dolls,
bonsai, armor, and swords. At harvest times, vegetables, fruits, flowers, and rice were
sent from all over Japan.^^

63 MacArthur Papers, ATIS-Letters to SCAP, RG-5, Reel #116.
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MacArthur recognized that he gained understanding and support by the
Japanese by receiving this flood of gifts and letters of appreciation from them. That
practice by Japanese nationals satisfied him proving that the occupation was
proceeding smoothly and satisfactorily for both the Allies and the Japanese. He
concluded that the first period of the occupation went so smoothly because of the
good cooperation of both the population and the officials of Japan. The Japanese
reaction to the initial occupation was so favorable that MacArthur issued an official
report in September 1945 in which he estimated the total occupation force could be
cut to 200,000 men by July 1, 1946.

The ATIS file also analyzed their

accomplishment from the letters and concluded with satisfaction that:
The press has been unshackled, the man on the street is not afraid to
speak his mind, the government is breaking away from the old traditions, a
new philosophy of education is developing, political status of Japanese
subjects has been broadened, and the principles of democracy are beginning
to make themselves felt throughout the land.^^
Oppressed by the authorities, nobody in Japan had expressed their opinion
towards policy makers by writing letters directly before the end of the war. By writing
to MacArtur to convey their thoughts or gratitude, they began practicing the principles
of democracy.
In sum, treated by the occupation troops with an unexpected generosity, the
Japanese responded and cooperated with them submissively. Because of MacArthur
and his advisers' wisdom in taking Japanese public opinion and psychology into
account when they made decisions, Japanese nationals found them favorable and
reliable. The Japanese obeyed the occupation authorities without causing major
opposition against them. Thus, the first period of the occupation went smoothly.

yLacPiiibm:, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.1, Supp.'pAl.
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4. Preserving the Emperor
Most of the people of the Allied countries wanted to punish Emperor
Hirohito as a war criminal. Many people on the Allied side also expected to abolish
the imperial system itself, arguing that it was too old-fashioned in the modem world
and that Shintoism, in which people worshiped the emperor as a living God, was the
cause of their militarism that led them fanatically into the war.®^ Nevertheless,
MacArthur preserved the system, believing that retaining the emperor, at least during
the initial stages of the occupation, would be a low-cost, low-risk method of providing
a vital transition for the Japanese. This judgment must have been a key of
MacArthur's success in the occupation of Japan.
MacArthur understood that the Japanese people had always needed a spiritual
ruler to worship and hold on to. He predicted it would have brought anarchy, chaos,
and guerrilla warfare if they had abolished the Emperor, especially in time of such
crisis. MacArthur wanted to avoid that, because it would require a larger contingent of
occupation forces to maintain order. Actually, Hirohito was of great use to the
occupation forces. MacArthur wisely concluded that if the Emperor ordered his
subjects to obey the occupation forces, they would obey. MacArthur preserved the
Emperor and the government machinery, because he and his staffs judged that
utilizing the existent authority was the most effective and easiest way to rebuild
Japan—at least for the first few years. Thus, the occupation plan was predicated upon
the ability of the Emperor to maintain psychological control over his people and any
potentially rebellious elements.70
Preserving the Emperor and the imperial institution were also of utmost
importance to the Japanese leadership. The initial reply of the Japanese government to
69 Dobbins, pp.38-39.
•^0 MacArthur, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.1, p.452.
26

the Potsdam Conference, communicated to the Allies through the Swiss, made
acceptance of surrender conditional on a guarantee of the Emperor's continued rule.
Specifically, the Japanese government said they were ready to accept the terms
declared at Potsdam "with the understanding that the said declaration does not
comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
Sovereign Ruler."71 However, they were refused by U.S. Secretary of State James F.
Byrnes. He responded by noting that the surrender would be unconditional and that
both the Emperor and the Japanese government would be subject to MacArthur upon
surrender.

American Public's Sentiment against Hirohito

Contrary to MacArthur's decision,

77 percent of Americans wanted the Emperor to be severely punished according to an
opinion poll conducted 6 weeks before the Japanese surrender.73 Because of the
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and the ferocity of the war in the
Pacific, there was strong anti-Japanese sentiment among the American public, and
most of it was directed at Emperor Hirohito, in whose name Japan fought. The Stars
and Stripes described him as "a toothy, bandy-legged, thin-chested and bespectacled
little man who liked coffee, bacon, and eggs for breakfast. He wrote sorry poetry and
he studied biology with a Western-made microscope, but to 70 million Japanese he
was Mr. God in person."^"* MacArthur's biographer, William Manchester, also
described how Emperor Hirohito looked to Western observers:
Hirohito

was

a

very

ordinary

man,

a

short,

absentminded,

forty-four-year-old father of six children who had inherited his father's
position nineteen years earlier and had been struggling ever since to make a
lAacPa:\h\xx:, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.11, Part II. p.l\b.
72 DOS, pp.57-58.
•^3 Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, New York- Oxford University
Press, 1985, p.3; Dower, p.299.
•^4 The Stars and Stripes, Victory Edition, August 15, 1945.
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success of it. His appearance was anything but imperial. On the streets of
New York or London he wouldn't have attracted a second glance. He was shy
and round-shouldered, with a Chaplinesque profile and a weak, receding chin.
His coordination was so shaky that he always seemed about to tumble over.
His mustache was straggly, his face covered with moles, his spectacle lenses
so thick that his eyes looked as though they had been put in by a taxidermist.
Around the house he wore shabby clothes and scuffed shoes. Often he
needed a shave: frequently he forgot to fasten his trousers. As a youth he had
toured Europe, where he had been introduced to jazz, whisky, and golf, all of
which he still enjoyed. His only known passion, however, was marine
biology. He had published several scholarly, if dull, books on marine life, and
he loved to disappear into his modest home laboratory for an afternoon with
his microscope and his slides. He probably preferred fish to people.^^
These were the general impressions of the Japanese Emperor in the Allied
countries. The former ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, believed that there was no
way the Emperor could avoid responsibility for having signed the declaration of war.
Within the U.S. government, the postwar status of the Emperor and the imperial
1ft
institution were the focus of particularly intense debates before Japan's surrender.

Reading the Psychology of the Japanese

MacArthur did not need advisers

around him to make decisions, but Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers was
exceptional.

Fellers

was

MacArthur's

military

secretary

and

chief

of

psychological-warfare operations. He advised MacArthur on affairs related to the
Emperor and Japanese psychology. Fellers had researched "The Psychology of the
Japanese Soldier" when he was attending the Command and General Staff School at
Fort Leavenworth as an army captain from 1934 to 1935. Through his study, he
predicted that the Japanese would adopt the suicidal "kamikaze" tactics once the war
situation got severe. His report "Answer to Japan," a revised version of his
psychological study of the Japanese, was used as an orientation guide for the Allied
•^5 Manchester, p.532.
™ Dobbins, p.38.
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intelligence personnel/^ He concluded the report that:
Years of blood baths may possibly be avoided if we understand clearly
our enemy and handle him intelligently. After Japan is totally defeated,
American justice must be the way and light. An independent Japanese army
responsible only to the Emperor is a permanent menace to peace. But the
mystic hold the Emperor has on his people and the spiritual strength of the
Shinto faith properly directed need not be dangerous. The Emperor can be
made a force for good and peace provided Japan is totally defeated and the
military clique destroyed. The Government must have a system of checks and
balances. The Emperor must be surrounded by liberal civilian leaders. The
military must be limited to an internal police force, responsible to civil
authority... Once the Tokyo gangster militarists are dead, once the armed
forces are destroyed and a liberal government formed under the Emperor, the
Japanese people—sadder, fewer, and wiser—can begin the reorientation of
their lives.^^
Fellers sent a second memorandum directly to MacArthur on October 2, 1945.
The emperor worship of the Japanese people was totally foreign and hard to
understand for people from any Christian country, and that included MacArthur.
Fellers studied the sentiment of the Japanese public toward the Emperor in depth, and
tried to convince MacArthur to keep the Emperor.
Memorandum To The Commander-in-Chief:
The attitude of the Japanese toward their Emperor is not generally
understood. Unlike Christians, the Japanese have no God with whom to
commune. Their Emperor is the living symbol of the race in whom lies the
virtues of their ancestors. He is the incarnation of national spirit, incapable of
wrong or misdeeds. Loyalty to him is absolute. Although no one fears him,
all hold their Emperor in reverential awe. They would not touch him, look
into his face, address him, step on his shadow. Their abject homage to him
amounts to a self abnegation sustained by a religious patriotism the depth of
which is incomprehensible to Westerners.
To try him as a war criminal would not only be blasphemous but a denial
of spiritual freedom.
Dower, p.280.
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The Imperial War Rescript, 8 December 1941, was the inescapable
responsibility of the Emperor who, as the head of a then sovereign state,
possessed the legal right to issue it. From the highest and most reliable
sources, it can be established that the war did not stem from the Emperor
himself. He has personally said that he had no intention to have the War
Rescript used as Tojo used it.
The masses are especially devoted to Hirohito. They feel that his
addressing the people personally make him unprecedentally close to them.
His rescript demanding peace filled them with joy.
By his order seven million soldiers laid down their arms and are being
rapidly demobilized. Through his act hundreds of thousands of American
casualties were avoided and the war terminated far ahead of schedule.
Therefore having made good use of the Emperor, to try him for war crimes,
to the Japanese, would amount to a breech of faith. Moreover, the Japanese
feel that unconditional surrender as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration
meant preservation of the State structure, which includes the Emperor.
If the Emperor were tried for war crimes the governmental structure
would collapse and a general uprising would be inevitable. The people will
uncomplainingly stand any other humiliation. Although they are disarmed,
there would be chaos and bloodshed.
American long range interests require friendly relations with the Orient
based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long run it is of
7Q
paramount, national importance that Japan harbor no lasting resentment.
Thus, despite the general hatred against Hirohito, MacArthur stuck to his
and Fellers' belief and enforced his policy of retaining the Emperor as a symbolic
head of the state.

Criticism against MacArtliur's "Soft Policy"

MacArthur's

decision

was

criticized by Americans and other Allied countries, which said his occupation policy
was too soft. As noted, MacArthur's goal was not to provoke the enemy by attacking
the Emperor. However, to most Westerners, Christians in particular, the notion of
emperor worship was incomprehensible. To speak of the emperor as the Son of
•^9 MacArthur Papers, Memorandum to the Commander in Chief from Bonner F.
Fellers, October 2, 1945. RG-5, Reel# 23.
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Heaven, as he was commonly termed in English, seemed close to equating him with
Christ, the Son of God. American observers did not want to accept this notion and
devoted a great deal of attention to this issue. To counter such views and gain support
for his occupation policy, MacArthur had to make sure that the Japanese officials
would separate Shintoism and the state stricdy, and launch a campaign to change the
Emperor's public image.
The General also worked hard to change the public image of the Emperor
into a democrat and peacemaker who had been duped by the militarist leaders into
waging a war he had not desired. MacArthur always mentioned his gratitude toward
Hirohito for cooperating with the occupation forces at every occasion. MacArthur
maintained that "the smooth occupation was really due to the Emperor's leadership."
His appreciation for Hirohito was widely reported in the Western press.80 In an
interview with the president of the United Press on September 21, 1945, MacArthur
said "this bloodless occupation would have been impossible without the retention of
the Emperor for surrender purposes and declared the maintenance of the Emperor
o1

during disarmament resulted in "untold saving of American lives, money and time."

Becoming a Human

Although the Emperor remained on the throne, MacArthur

assumed the sovereign authority to rule the state, in accordance with the Potsdam
Declaration. Then, on the first New Year's Day after the war ended, Hirohito issued a
statement, known as "declaration of humanity," renouncing his divinity. It was the
first formal address to his subjects since August 15, the day of surrender. Revising his
constitutional status drastically and becoming a human, Hirohito managed to satisfy
many of his foreign critics that he no longer claimed divinity. Following that
Dower, p.295.
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announcement, he began touring the country. He visited almost every prefecture in
order to boost morale and support the objectives of the occupation. Dressed in a
Western suit, the Emperor walked toward and talked to the people for the first time in
Japanese history. He was no longer a living God, he had become a human. This
dramatic change had a great impact not only on the Japanese but also on foreigners,
proving that the status of the emperor had really changed.

Emperor and the War

The

Allies never seriously

investigated

the

responsibility of the Emperor for the war. However, Reports of General MacArthur
filed an unpublished manuscript by Marquis Yasumasa Matsudaira, The Japanese
Emperor and The War, in which he emphasized Hirohito's pacifism and lack of
responsibility for the war. It was written in December 1949 in response to a request
from the G-2 Historical Section of the GHQ. The GHQ intended to encourage better
understanding about the Japanese emperor among Westerners by crediting the
important role played by Hirohito in the termination of the Pacific War and his
influence in bringing hostilities to an end.
Matsudaira was one of the Emperor's trusted advisors and wrote that the
Emperor was a pacifist, that he tried to prevent the war but could do nothing, and that
he tried to end the war as soon as possible for the sake of his nation and mankind.
Matsudaira also revealed that there was a wide divergence of views between the
Cabinet and the military. Military leaders, led by War Minister Hideki Tojo, were firm
believers in "total war," which would be fought not by soldiers alone but by gearing
09

up the national economy, politics, and public opinion.

Oppressed by the military

leaders who were eager to go to war for the nation's imperialistic expansion, he said,

82 Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East
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civilian officials in the Cabinet were too weak and powerless to oppose them; the
Imperial conference of December 1, 1941 attended by all ministers of state as well as
the Chiefs of the Army and Navy commands unanimously decided on war.
Matsudaira described the first part (1926-1936) of the Showa Era, the period
when Hirohito was in throne, as representing a great change in Japanese thought and
in the economy. The economic depression after the World War I heavily impacted the
lives of Japanese people and engendered extremist movements both to the right and to
the left. It was, Matsudaira analyzed, an era of political instability when the military
clique raised its head and Japanese foreign policy took on a markedly aggressive
character.
Matsudaira also noted that the position of the emperor in the Japanese
governmental scheme had no right to deny the decisions made in the Cabinet; all he
could do was to sign the final form and take all responsibility for the outcome. "The
King reigns but does not rule." This English proverb, Matsudaira wrote, was literally
translated into action by Hirohito.^'* From Meiji Era, it had been an unwritten law that
the Emperor would approve any decision of the Government, never would he veto it.
Despite the experience of Japanese expansionism, Matsudaira saw this practice as the
most appropriate means of safeguarding monarchy from falling into dictatorship and
fitting it into the system of a constitutional government. The principle under the old
constitution that the Emperor shall always rely on the advice and assistance of his
ministers in all matters of state, had established a rule that the Emperor was not to
exercise the veto as an Imperial prerogative.85
Considering these conditions, Matsudaira expanded on two major reasons
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why Hirohito could not prevent the war. First, the mihtary—especially the Army—was
extremely high-handed and intractable, and ignored the wishes of the Emperor.
Second, the Government and the Diet, and public opinion itself were all powerless
before the military because of their aggressiveness toward the war and the public
education encouraging to back their points of view.^^ Japan was a deeply militarized
society, and the discipline of small boys was Spartan, with the object of turning them
into tough soldiers.

The Emperor's role was to sign the final form and be

responsible for the decision: an unwritten law made the Emperor approve any
decision of the Government, he would never veto it, even though he was determined
to prevent the war from the beginning to the end.
Matsudaira also noted that the Emperor was pessimistic about the course of
the war, seeing no hope of victory over the highly mechanized Allied forces, at the
same time he was sympathetic for the war dead and their families. Thus, the Emperor
thought the war should be stopped, and he favored a diplomatic solution with
acceptable conditions to end the war before the Soviet Union could join the war in the
Pacific. Ultimately, things did not go the way the Emperor wanted, and he could not
announce the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration until his country was attacked by
two devastating atomic bombs. Finally, Hirohito could approve the surrender, saying
that "I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the
only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress
with which it is burdened."
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Americans' understanding of MacArthur's decision to retain the Emperor by
explaining Japan's political circumstances and promoting Hirohito's positive traits
and behavior. Also, Matsudaira's description of the collapsed Japanese political
system helped to prove that GHQ needed to transform the Japanese Imperial
Government into democratic political

institution as one of

the work of

democratization. The occupation officials determined to reform the structure of the
Japanese political system into a democratic one in which checks and balances would
function and to resituate the Emperor as the center of their new democracy.

Japanese People's Concerns for the Emperor

Most of the Japanese favored and

appreciated MacArthur's decision not to punish the Emperor. Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida praised MacArthur as the "great benefactor" of Japan, referring to his
preservation of the throne and protection of the Emperor in a time of unprecedented
events.89 The Liberal Party of Japan made a statement on the first anniversary of the
end of the war, expressing their gratitude toward the Allied powers, especially to
General MacArthur's headquarters, for understanding the Japanese people's need to
continue the imperial system, as well as for their generous relief measures extended in
the serious food crises.^'^
A majority of the Japanese public in fact favored the preservation of the
Emperor and the imperial system. Public opinion polls conducted on December 9,
1945 revealed that 95 percent of the Japanese favored preserving the imperial
system.®' Reflecting this sentiment, many Japanese people sent letters to GHQ to
appeal MacArthur for clemency for the emperor and the maintenance of the imperial
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system.92 The National Archives in Washington D.C. holds collection of some of the
important documents and correspondence during the occupation. Among them are 164
letters expressing concerns about the Emperor.A majority of the letters were sent to
GHQ between November 1945 and January 1946. GHQ received a great many letters
after Emperor Hirohito visited MacArthur at the American embassy in Tokyo on
September 27, 1945, asking that the Emperor be saved from punishment as a war
criminal. The Japanese people were shocked to see the picture of MacArthur and
Hirohito in newspapers. MacArthur was dressed casually with his hands on his waist;
the Emperor dressed formally and stood next to General, dwarfed by the larger
American. For some people, this photo finally triggered a recognition that Japan had
lost the war. The picture made it obvious that the General was the new ruler and the
Emperor was the head of the defeated country. Thereafter, the Japanese people had
some kind of sympathy for the humbled Hirohito, who now had to call on MacArthur.
To the Japanese, it was inconceivable before that the Emperor would visit someone,
he had to be visited. Even the tour around the country after his declaration of
humanity made the nationals feel sympathetic for Hirohito.
Reflecting this sympathy, most of the Japanese people hoped that Hirohito
would not be punished at the Tokyo trial. Some of the letters expressed the fact that,
for the Japanese, Hirohito was a parent, the object of their faith, and if something
happened to him, the people would lose their purpose of living. They begged in the
letters, "Please, General MacArthur, I ask you again and again, do not put the emperor
on trial."^'^ In extreme cases, they wrote petitions with their blood. These letters made
MacArthur aware of the extreme nationalism that might be unleashed if he punished
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the Emperor. Mac Arthur had already decided to retain the Emperor before he met
Hirohito, but, surely, those letters from the Japanese helped him and his staff better
recognize the people's desire to preserve the Emperor.^^
Again, retaining the Emperor was one of the factors that made the occupation
of Japan successful. MacArthur analyzed the status of the emperor for the people of
Japan as well as their psychological patterns. And he made a great use of the Emperor.
MacArthur could govern the Japanese effectively with the support of the Emperor,
instead of causing the chaos and bloodshed by punishing him. The Japanese people
obeyed the occupation troops submissively because the Emperor ordered them to do
so. Thus, the occupation mission went smoothly. MacArthur and his adviser wisely
predicted it.

95 Manchester, p.577.
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5. Americans' View of Japan

Sentiment Against the Japanese

To gain the support and understanding from

Americans toward the occupation mission of democratizing Japan, MacArthur had to
change the propagandistic view that persisted in American people's mind not only
about the Emperor but about Japan as a whole. Ever since the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor, newspapers had kept reporting the brutal batdes and fanatic fighting style of
Japanese soldiers such as "kamikaze pilots" and "hara-kiri" by Japanese POWs. The
American people were told that all Japanese were treacherous, brutal, children, apes,
sadistic, fanatical, savages, madmen, robots, monkey-men, and the most militaristic
nationals in the world.^® Since the notion of emperor worship was blasphemous to
Christians, they perceived the imperial system and Shinto, which encouraged
militarism and imperial expansion, as superstitions that should be abolished. To speak
of the emperor as the Son of Heaven (as he was commonly termed in English) they
thought, seemed perilously close to equating him with Christ and that was
07

unacceptable for Christians.

The Victory Edition of The Stars and the Stripes exemplified U.S. views of
Japan. "Japan, the little nation that removed a smiling, obsequious mask to reveal the
face of a gorilla," it repeated, "with that beast's strength, instincts and demeanor, lay
go

in utter defeat today before the United States and its Allies."

It also described Japan

as a totally alien place, and the "strangest country in the world."
Japan has a deceptive appearance of being quaint. Actually the
people are suspicious of one another, gregarious and mass conceited but
individually humble. They regard everything about their country as holy.
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As a nation the Japs lack imagination, copying much from other
countries. Traditional art, literature and architecture were results of steals
from China, yet now Nipponese culture is a homogeneous blend drawn from
many foreign civilizations.
In some ways Japan is the strangest country in the world. White is
the color of mourning and black the color of ceremony. Newspapers are read
from right to left and when tea is brewed, masks are worn over the mouth to
"safeguard the aroma of the tea."
The Japanese take baths of 140 degrees, hotter than any other people
can endure, and instead of sleeping in comfortable beds they prefer a straw
mat on the floor with a hollow porcelain pillow for a head rest.
Such exaggerated images of Japan were reported continuously by American
media. Thus, it was necessary for the occupation officials to give American people a
positive impression of the Japanese to gain support and understanding for the
occupation mission. The instructional film for GHQ officials, "Our Job in Japan"
emphasized that the Japanese were a people trained to play "follow-the-leader."^^
They were victims of the nation, it said, so the occupation forces had to liberate them
from their state of slavery. Joseph Grew, ambassador to Japan from 1932 to 1942,
published a collection of his diaries and official documents in 1944, in the midst of
the war in the Pacific. He described the great strength and fanatical determination, the
utter cruelty and brutality of the Japanese military. However, his true aim was to ease
the tension between the peoples of the two countries for the latter days when they had
to deal with the postwar reconstruction. He thus informed Americans that there were
innocent people in Japan who bitterly opposed the war with the United States.'*^
While Americans' hatred of the Japanese grew during the brutal war, the
Japanese people were also taught that their enemies, the Americans and the British in
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particular, "were devils: hardly human at all, barbaric beyond belief.""" Japan's
leaders took pains to set Japan apart from others. During the war, the Japanese
routinely referred to themselves as the leading race of the world.On the day of the
Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese government approved a document entitled "An
outline of Information and Propaganda Policies for the War between Japan and the
Anglo-American Powers." It stated that "the enemy's selfish desire for world
conquest made war unavoidable, and Japan's cause was a moral one. The country's
goal was to create a new world order which would enable all nations and races to
assume their proper place in the world, and all peoples to be at peace in their own
sphere."'®^
It was one of MacArthur's accomplishments that he helped remove the hatred
between the peoples of Japan and the U.S. through the work of the occupation.
MacArthur's willingness to help the enemy country recover was particularly
remarkable in light of his personal experience of many brutal battles. Putting aside
any personal feelings, throughout the occupation, MacArthur left a good impression
of the Americans through the generosity of their troops and his leadership and dignity.
He also reported the positive reactions from the Japanese toward the occupation to the
people of the United States.

MacArthur's Perception of Japan

Because of the strong hatred felt toward

the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, the American public did not support the work of the
occupation of Japan to the extent they backed the same mission in Germany.

Thus,

MacArthur initially had difficulty getting attention, understanding, and material
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support for his mission in Japan. He thus had to work to promote the positive image
of the Japanese and show the progress he had made in Japan. In a radio address to the
people of the United States after the surrender ceremony on September 2, 1945,
MacArthur expressed the belief that the people of Japan needed to be liberated:
We stand in Tokyo today reminiscent of our countryman,
Commodore Perry, ninety-two years ago. His purpose was to bring to Japan
an era of enlightenment and progress by lifting the veil of isolation to the
friendship, trade and commerce of the world. But, alas, the knowledge
thereby gained of Western science was forged into an instrument of
oppression and human enslavement. Freedom of expression, freedom of
action, even freedom of thought were denied through supervision of liberal
education, through appeal to superstition and through the application of force.
We are committed by the Potsdam Declaration of Principles to see that the
Japanese people are liberated from this condition of slavery. It is my purpose
to implement this commitment just as rapidly as the armed forces are
demobilized and other essential steps taken to neutralize the war potential.
The energy of the Japanese race, if properly directed, will enable expansion
vertically rather than horizontally. If the talents of the race are turned into
constructive channels, the country can lift itself from its present deplorable
state into a position of dignity...
He also explained that "during the progress of the war, these seventy million
heard of nothing but Japanese victories and the bestial qualities of Japan's opponents.
When they suddenly felt the concentrated shock of total defeat, their whole world
crumbled. It was not merely an overthrow of their military might—not merely a great
defeat for their nation—^he explained; it was the collapse of a faith, the disintegration
of everything they had believed in and lived by and thought for. It left a complete
vacuum morally, mentally and physically."'"^
Unlike his public statements, however, MacArthur seemed, in his own mind.
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to harbor images of Japanese as belUgerent and natural warriors.

His

psychological-warfare adviser. Fellers, researched Japanese behavior patterns and
identified "a fifteen-point mantra": inferiority complex, credulousness, regimented
thought, tendency to misrepresent, self-dramatization, strong sense of responsibility,
super-aggressiveness, brutality, inflexibility, tradition of self-destruction, superstition,
face-saving tendency, intense emotionality, attachment to home and family, and
Emperor worship.'"^ Even after the return to the United States in April 1951,
MacArthur publicly described the Japanese as "a boy of twelve"'®^ compared to 45
years-old Germans. In his view, Japan resembled the feudalistic European nations of
four centuries earlier, and in some aspects of their way of living was more
old-fashioned than that. To him, the people's worship of the emperor as God and
absolute sovereign was more like ancient Sparta than a modem nation.
In his later reminiscences he reiterated his original perception of Japan but
admitted it was a false conception.
Supposedly, the Japanese were a twentieth-century civilization. In
reality, they were more nearly a feudal society, of the type discarded by
Western nations some four centuries ago. There were aspects of Japanese life
that went farther back than that. Although theocracy was a system of
government that had been thoroughly discredited by 3,000 years of progress
in the Western world, it still existed in Japan. The Emperor was considered a
divine being, and the average Japanese subject dared not even lift up his eyes
to view his ruler. This God-Emperor was absolute. His word was final...
There was no such thing as civil rights. There were not even human rights.
The property and produce of the average Japanese individual could be taken
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away from him in whole or in part as it suited the ruling cliques. Between
1937 and 1940 more than 60,000 people were thrown into prison for
"dangerous thinking" by the secret police. Indeed, an American viewing
Japan would be inclined to class it as more nearly akin to ancient Sparta than
to any modern nation.
For almost four years the Japanese people had expected nothing but
victory. Every bulletin blared of success. Not only that; the people had been
told they were fighting a kind of holy crusade against barbarians who had no
respect for anything. The war must be won to prevent rape, murder, and other
unspeakable crimes. As a leader of the American forces, the Japanese
government concentrated on me. When American troops landed in Japan in
August 1945, the image of the sadistic commander and his rapacious soldiery
was in every Japanese hiiod.
From the very beginning I tried to erase this false conception. In my
speech aboard the Missouri I had very carefully tried to reassure the Japanese
people, and a few days later, when I moved my headquarters into the Dai Ichi
Building, I made a public statement that "SCAP is not concerned with how to
keep Japan down, but how to get her on her feet again." I underlined again
and again that we had several missions. It was true that we intended to
destroy Japan as a militarist power. It was true that we intended to impose
penalties for past wforigis. These things had been set out in the surrender
terms. But we also felt lhat we could best accomplish our purpose by
building a new kind of Japan, one that would give the Japanese people
freedom and justice, and some kind of security. I was determined that our
principles during the occupation would be the same principles for which our
soldiers had fought on the battlefield.'"^
Democratizing From Within

One of the Japanese systems that looked so

feudalistic to MacArthur was the family structure in Japan. GHQ officials studied the
system from a report sent to Bonner Fellers by a former professor of Tokyo Imperial
University who was discharged for liberal tendencies."' This professor explained the
old-fashioned Japanese family system and requested that the General democratize the
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family. The writer argued that the essence of the Japanese family was the succession
of family-chiefs like the ancient dynasties. Children were not allowed to form their
own opinions, the position of women was that of half-slaves, and there was no
financial independence to subordinate males and female members of the family.
Inequality between husbands and wives was extraordinary. Women had no
educational, social, or economic equality, not to mention political equality. In this
writer's view, obedience, not love was the cement of the Japanese family. He insisted
love and mutual respect needed to be introduced to democratize this small feudal
society called the family.
The writer also argued that the strong patriarchal tendency of the Japanese
family system should be altered to favor women's influence in the family. Women
were taught in old-fashioned families to endure silently the misconduct of the husband.
While wife's adultery was always criminal, for example, a husband's was criminal
only when it was committed with a married woman. Moreover, children had no
freedom in choosing a marriage partner, and men under the age of 25 and women
under 30 could not marry without permission of their parents.
This report must have shocked GHQ officers and other Westerners, because it
was so different from the Western experience. MacArthur was eager to revise the
constitution to emancipate Japanese women from their slave status of men. He
believed that "women, like men, had souls. Therefore, they should be treated equally."
Thus, he launched that reform right away and, indeed, Japanese women achieved
suffrage in December 1945, in just 3 months after the occupation started. Marriage
and divorce statutes were also rewritten, contract marriage and concubinage were
prohibited, high schools became coeducational, and twenty-six women's universities
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were opened.112

MacArthur's Mission

MacArthur perceived his role not as a conqueror but as a

protector and a guardian of the Japanese people. He understood the Japanese needed
spiritual leadership as well as material administration, since they suffered from "shell
shock" and faced the despair of the massive defeat."^ MacArthur said, "never in
history had a nation and its people been more completely crushed" and "the bitter
sting and humiliation of defeat had left the people dazed, tottering, and numb with
shock."'"*
MacArthur played a role of a strong dictator with his understanding that the
Japanese were used to being governed by force and authority. MacArthur's biographer,
William Manchester, revealed that MacArthur later said of Asians that "even after 50
years of living among these people, I still don't understand them.""^ However,
publicly, as a commander, he had to show the confidence that he completely
understood the Japanese. It was true that he spent many years before in the
Philippines and he understood the Filipinos. However, Japan was initially exotic and
very foreign country for him. So, MacArthur had studied Japanese folklore, politics,
and economy. Most of all he had researched how Hirohito's people lived, worked, and
thought. He was astute and quick to leam things, and he could sense what he should
do and what the Japanese people needed. One of his closest advisers, General
Courtney Whitney, revealed that despite the commander's own misgivings,
"MacArthur knew the Orient, the basic Japanese character, and their national spirit of
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traditional chivalry called Bushido."^^^ And in hindsight MacArthur said he was
"thoroughly familiar with Japanese administration, its weaknesses and its strengths,"
and that the reforms he contemplated were those that would bring Japan abreast of
modem progressive thought and action.117 Thus, he did not need much advice from
his staff. Reflecting his understanding of Japanese hierarchy, he never allowed
Japanese officials to meet him except for the Emperor Hirohito and a few prime
ministers and high-ranking cabinet members. In that way, he tried to keep a certain
distance from the Japanese and behaved like a charismatic and unapproachable ruler,
as if he had assumed the emperor's throne.
From the moment of his appointment as supreme commander, MacArthur
recognized his mission was to become an economist, a political scientist, an engineer,
a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts, in order to rebuild a
nation that had been almost completely destroyed by the war.'

His perception of his

duty and his demeanor as a charismatic leader with absolute authority proved
effective in ruling the Japanese citizens.
MacArthur also worked hard to let American people know the importance of
the survival of Japan and stability of this region for the national interests of the United
States. He understood Japanese people's tremendous energy and vast potential and
that the fate of this country would matter to Americans in the future. He knew that,
although most people thought of Japan as small, it was considerably larger than Italy
and half the size of the United Kingdom, with roughly twice the population of each of
the four big countries in Western Europe—West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy,
and France."^ He argued that Japan was "the bulwark of freedom, the springboard of
116
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118
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the future, and Americans had not begun to reaUze its vast potentialities."'^" After he
returned to the United States in 1951, he gave speeches all across the States and
enthusiastically told people the significance of maintaining peace and stability in the
Asia Pacific region. His address before the House of Representatives on April 19,
1951 at which he reported his accomplishments in Japan and the situation in the Far
East, was typical. He insisted that Americans had to understand the importance of this
region for the United States, and that they must understand about the Asian people,
their background, and the conditions under which they were suffering, rather than just
hating them and clinging to past negative impressions:
While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no
less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the
one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other...
Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 percent of its natural
resources, these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral
and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of
the design of modem progress to their own distinct cultural environments.
Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the
direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the
shift of the world economic frontiers, as the whole epicenter of world affairs
rotates back toward the area whence it started... What they seek now is
friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction; the
dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of
life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake.
World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood.
What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their
stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their
heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force
intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our
Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire
Pacific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it.
Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands
120
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of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of
islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and
191
our free allies.
MacArthur made every decision without Japanese officials' involvement and
he believed in his judgment, despite the general opinion of the American public. He
played a role of strong dictator and enforced his policy, and that approved worked out
well with the Japanese. Whether it was his natural personality or his intention, his
strong attitude as a commander suited well his duty of Supreme Commander of the
occupation of Japan. MacArthur often intimated that his only guides were George
Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Jesus Christ, and he seemed to operate on the
assumption

that

the four

of

them

together could—with

help from

the

emperor—democratize Japan.As Washington and Lincoln had fought wars and
saved the nation, MacArthur attempted to save Japan with his charismatic leadership
and absolute authority, even though it was not his own country. As Jesus Christ guides
people spiritually, MacArthur tried to be a leader to guide a former enemy, the
Japanese, and support them in their recovery from material and spiritual defeat.
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6. Why the U.S. Helped Japan: Messianic Zeal for Civilizing Japan

After demobilization, democratizing Japan was the second most important
mission of the occupation. In the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies stated that they did
not intend to destroy or just punish the Japanese by force. Instead, their aim was to
democratize feudalistic Japan and liberate its people from their old fashioned social
system, and to help them rebuild their devastated country. The Potsdam Declaration
stated:
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or
destroyed as a nation, but stem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals,
including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of
religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights,
shall be established.'^^
After GHQ completed the demobilization, they could have left Japan without
helping their reconstruction. Yet they stayed and continued humanitarian activities.
United States officials, especially MacArthur, must have had a messianic zeal for the
occupation of Japan. In addition to demobilizing Japanese forces and building up the
U.S. military presence in the Pacific through the occupation, MacArthur devoted
himself to liberate the Japanese from the imperialistic state by injecting American
values of democracy and Christianity. He was committed to emancipating women
from inequality, to liberalizing and modernizing the social system, and to
democratizing education.
In truth, MacArthur perceived the democratic reform of Japan as a God-given
mission.It was the white men's duty to civilize the Oriental. Just like his father,
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who saved the FiHpinos from the Spanish invasion in 1898, MacArthur was also a
hero in the Philippines, where some of the most brutal atrocities by the Japanese took
place during the World War II. The Philippines was a U.S. Commonwealth from 1935
to 1946. MacArthur supervised the Filipinos' creation of a Philippine Army. As the
gratitude for that contribution, Filipino President, Manuel Quezon granted Douglas
MacArthur the rank of Field Marshal of the Philippines in 1937, the highest rank ever
conveyed to an American.
The American movement of expanding the frontier on the American
continent and imperialistic expansion overseas in the late nineteenth century stemmed
from a belief in Manifest Destiny—a belief that the United States has a God-given
mission to expand to spread democracy and freedom in the world. MacArthur's
mission of saving East Asian civilians and promoting American democracy in the
Pacific had a similarity to that belief. He wrote later that his democratization mission
of Japan was an experiment. "Japan had become the world's great laboratory for an
experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule and for the
liberalization of government from within. It was clear that the experiment in Japan
must go far beyond the primary purpose of the Allies—the destruction of Japan's
ability to wage another war and the punishment of war criminals."125
However, it was contradictory that while MacArthur was calling for freedom
of belief, he forced the Japanese to reform their system with the American value of
democracy from above. While he was encouraging his troops to leam some aspects
from Japanese culture, they believed Western culture and its values were superior to
those of the Orient and forced the Japanese to adopt them.
For example, GHQ officials seriously considered abolishing the use of
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"kanji," Chinese characters that the Japanese used as one of their alphabets, and
allowing only "katakana," another alphabet which is simpler than kanji, in order to
make it easier for GHQ officials to screen and investigate documents written in
Japanese. They were in urgent need of personnel who could read Japanese writing to
monitor their publications and documents, but training Americans in kanji was
extremely difficult and time consuming. They found that katakana would be simpler
and easier to leam in a short term. Some even called for abolishing all the Japanese
alphabets and replacing them with anglicized "romaji." The supporters of this plan
argued that teaching kanji to Japanese children was wasting time that could be spent
on learning other things. American intellectuals who opposed this idea argued that it
would ruin Japan's cultural and intellectual heritage and might also cause serious
social chaos. Eventually, one idea of changing Japanese writing system was dismissed
because MacArthur wanted to avoid changing something so close to their daily lives
so drastically.'^^
Thus, the fate of Japan was in MacArthur's hands, from small reforms such
as writing system to comprehensive ones like drafting a new constitution. Japanese
citizens were no longer subjects of the Emperor, but they still remained subjects of the
occupation. It was inevitable that there be inequality between the victors and the
vanquished. However, the occupation reflected Americans' belief in their superiority
to the Japanese, and white supremacy to the Asian. MacArthur himself said that "Asia
was culturally and politically backward, and that the Oriental mind had been
socialized to obey authority,"and took for granted that the nations of the Far East
still had to be led into this new era by such authority figures as himself. Ultimately, as

126 Toshio Nishi, Kurd Yaburete MacArthur, Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, Inc., 2005,
pp.360-370.
127 Dower (1999), p.286.
51

noted, MacArthur was right about reading the patterns of Japanese people's behavior
and his tactics of being a dictator worked effectively in handling the Japanese
nationals.

Christianization as a Way of Democratization

One

thing

that

MacAxthur

attempted but could not accomplish was the Christian conversion of the Japanese. A
devout Christian himself, MacArthur strongly believed that making the Japanese
believe in Christianity would keep them from despair. Through the mission of
separating Shinto strictly from politics and education, he enthusiastically brought over
2,500 Christian missionaries from the United States to Japan during the occupation
period,128 and provided them with military planes, trains, and residences. MacArthur
said "The more missionaries we can bring out here, and the more occupation troops
we can send home, the better." 129 He also requested that the Pocket Testament League
distribute 10,000,000 Bibles translated into Japanese. MacArthur believed that
Christian ideal must be instilled to change the belligerent, nationalistic Japanese spirit
that stemmed from Shinto. MacArthur thought that one mission of the occupation was
to build "Christian highways" in Japan. He believed that every member of the
occupation force was a missionary, and they were communicating a noble influence to
the Japanese mind.
MacArthur further believed in the close connection between Christianity and
democracy and insisted that believing in Christianity would help the Japanese accept
the value of democracy. "We need to emphasize with clarity the essential usefulness
of Christianity in human progress," he argued, "democracy and Christianity have
much in common, as practice of the former is impossible without giving faithful
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service to the fundamental concepts underlying the latter."'^^ Thus, he welcomed the
election in may 1947 of a new Prime Minister, Tetsu Katayama, who happened to be a
Christian. MacArthur stated that "of possibly even greater significance than the
political implications of Mr. Katayama's emergence as Prime Minister of Japan are its
spiritual implications. For the first time in history, Japan is led by a Christian
leader—one who throughout his life has been a member of the Presbyterian Church. It
reflects the complete religious tolerance which now dominates the Japanese mind and
the complete religious freedom which exists throughout this land."131 MacArthur
found it significant for the international community of the Asia-Pacific region that
Christians led the three important nations in the region: Chiang Kai-shek of China,
Manuel Roxas of the Philippines, and Tetsu Katayama of Japan.MacArthur must
have felt hopeful of establishing a coalition through Christian values with all these
Christian leaders, believing that expanding democracy combined with Christianity
would bring peace in the Pacific when they were facing communist influences in the
region.
Further, MacArthur found it encouraging when Tokyo Imperial University
elected a Christian, Shigeru Nanbara, for the president in December, 1945. TIU was
the top national university of Japan and was very influential in Japanese society.
MacArthur might have thought he could Christianize the whole country with the
influence of the university and support by Nanbara. However, when Nanbara's effort
to start teaching a course of Christianity at his university ended in vain because of the
budget problem, MacArthur and his Christian colleagues came up with an idea to
establish a new Christian university instead on their own. The former ambassador to
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Japan, Joseph Grew became the president of the committee to found International
Christian University. The creation of ICU reflected a belief that only Christianity
could save the Japanese from the old spirit of militaristic feudalism, and it would lead
to a bright democracy instead of communism. 133 MacArthur supported their fund
raising as an honorary chairman. International Christian University was established in
Mitaka, Tokyo in 1953.
Christianity was to be the core pillar of most of MacArthur's occupation
policies. In his personal correspondence to Dr. Roy G. Ross, MacArthur wrote "The
principles underlying the Christian faith furnished the moral force for the defeat of the
Japanese empire and provided the philosophy for the treatment of the fallen foe...
Christian faith has formed the sturdy cornerstones upon which has rested our national
strength...

Thereafter,

it

became

those

same

high

principles of

human

relationship—tolerance and justice, the basic dogma of our Christian faith—that formed
the very key arch to the philosophy underlying all policy governing the treatment of
our vanquished foe in the occupation of Japan."^^"*
Accordingly, MacArthur seemed to want to convert all the Japanese into
Christians. Yet despite MacArthur's efforts and those of other enthusiastic Christian
movements, Japan did not become a Christian country. The number of Christians in
Japan before the war was believed to be around 200,000. After the occupation, the
number only grew to be 250,000, out of all the population of 80,000,000.^^^ This was
one of a few things MacArthur did not accomplish.
It is worth arguing whether MacArthur's policy of promoting Christianity
conflicted with his policy of freedom of religion. As noted, while GHQ strictly
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separated Shinto from Japanese politics and education, they encouraged the Japanese
people to believe in Christianity. Christian Japanese praised MacArthur as the second
Jesus Christ, however, some intellectuals began to point out this contradiction.
MacArthur legitimized his policy by arguing that the occupation troops had the right
to promote Christianity as far as no other specific religions were suppressed.
MacArthur, with a tendency to be blind about things he did not do well, insisted the
estimate of the number of Christian Japanese after the occupation as 2,000,000,
adding an extra zero to the real number.

Differences from the German Occupation

T.V Soong, a Chinese politician,

pointed out that "It's ironical, but the victor has to help get the vanquished back on his
feet."'^^ That applies to the case of World War II. The Allies occupied Germany, as
well. They launched the occupation in Germany after Hitler committed suicide and
Germany surrendered unconditionally on May 7, 1945. The world needed both
countries to be rebuilt, because Japan was the hub of East Asian industry and
commerce (China wanted to restart trading with Japan), and Germany had been the
hub of continental European industry and commerce and had supplied coal to
European nations. Now they had both collapsed. The primary aims of the occupation
of Germany were initially the same as that of Japan—disarmament and punishment of
war criminals, and both then changed to emphasize rebuilding. However, the
conditions of the occupation of two countries were fundamentally different from each
other.
First, and most important, while the United States operated Japan's
occupation unilaterally, the occupation of Germany was operated multilaterally by the
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Allied four powers—the United States, England, France, and the Soviet Union, which
divided the country into four zones and administered them separately. The capital of
West Germany, Berlin, was occupied jointly, with each power administering a sector
of the city, and was governed by an inner-Allied authority. There were also agencies
that coordinated the occupation by four powers—the Council of Foreign Ministers and
the Control Council. Unlike the Far Eastern Commission in Japan, which was
supposed to monitor the occupation of Japan by the representatives from each Allied
country, these agencies for Germany functioned well to ensure appropriate uniformity
of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in each zone of occupation and to reach agreed
decisions on the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole.

1 ^8

However, this

system caused delays in the decision making process and mitigated against a smoother
transformation of Germany.
Second, while MacArthur was able to make use of existent Japanese
institutions such as the government and the presence of the Emperor as a symbol of
the state head to facilitate cooperation and the smooth implementation of policy, the
German occupation was required to establish the government from scratch. This
process was time consuming. Since the first and foremost mission there was the
"denazification" of German society, the Allies had to dismantle the political and legal
structures that the Nazi party had created in Germany, and they had to arrest, punish,
and exclude active Nazis from public life. This left no governmental institutions
operating.
Third, tensions among the four occupying powers, especially between the
Soviet Union and the Western allies, prevented a harmonious occupation and
disturbed the establishment of central German institutions. The multilateral
13^ U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany- Policy and Progress 1945-46,
Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.2783, 1947, p.3.
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occupation effort had become hopelessly deadlocked by 1947.139
Thus, some historians have considered the occupation of Japan as more
successful than the one of Germany, noting that Japan's transformation was quicker,
smoother, and in many ways, easier than Germany's."'^® Things also went more
slowly in Germany because the German occupation lacked the focused intensity that
came with America's unilateral control over Japan, where occupation authority was
centered in one nation and, indeed, one man—MacArthur. This made the
reconstruction process less troublesome than in Germany, since neither MacArthur
nor GHQ were obligated to consult with other countries. In fact, Germany did not
receive complete sovereignty until the end of the Cold War and German reunification
in 1989 and 1990, whereas Japan regained sovereignty in 1952 with signing of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty.'^'
Although the primary aims of occupation were the same, their goals seemed
different. As MacArthur later referred to the Japanese as 12 years-old, compared to
the Germans as mature as 45 years-old, the Allied officials saw the Japanese and the
German differently and treated them differently. The Allies, Westerners, looked down
on the Japanese, the Orientals, as an uncivilized race and were enthusiastic about
civilizing Japan with Western values. Thus, the democratization program was
enforced more intensively in Japan, and the transformation of social system focused
on a wide range of issues, from the constitution to education and religion.
This notwithstanding, people and governments of the Allied countries paid
more attention to and were more supportive to German situation. In fact, MacArthur
initially received only limited economic aid from the U.S. government for his mission
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in Japan and for the entire occupation of Japan, he only got $2 billion. The American
zone in West Germany, with one-fifth the population of Japan, received, per capita, 3
times the money sent to Tokyo.Fellers described that "the war in the Pacific was
racial, whereas the war in Europe was political and social."'"'^ So, too, was the
postwar treatment. While the German occupation focused on political and economic
reform, GHQ went further in an effort to transform the Japanese people's culture and
spirit. The Germans had some experience with democracy in the years prior to the
World War II and they, like the Allies, were Westerners. Japan, on the other hand, was
perceived as a feudalistic empire, and most of all, they were "Oriental." Thus, the U.S.
officials thought Japan needed to be civilized and be transformed to the core by the
Westerners.
That MacArthur accomplished the aims of occupation in Japan more quickly
and smoothly than the mission was accomplished in Germany was a great
achievement particularly as he had to transform a nation whose people were
completely alien to Westerners. It worked out well for him, because he could
administer Japan by himself with absolute authority, and his sole leadership was what
the Japanese needed at the time of defeat. It does not mean that it would have been
quicker and worked better if another single commander, perhaps Eisenhower,
operated the occupation of entire Germany unilaterally. The German nationality is
different from that of the Japanese. MacArthur's mission was successful because all
the aspects—Japanese national character, the timing of emergency after the war,
MacArthur's personaUty, and his tactics—matched perfectly.
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7. The New Constitution

State under Meiji Constitution

Under

the

old

constitution,

which

was

established in 1889, during the Meiji era, Japan did not have a parliament constitution.
Rather, it vested sovereign power in the emperor and divided political power among a
small set of competing elites. The political parties competed for power with the
military, the bureaucracy, the leading industrialists ("zaibatsu"), and groups close to
the emperor. Beginning in 1925, all men over the age of 25 were granted the right to
vote, but their representatives in the Diet could easily be outmaneuvered because the
majority party in the Diet did not automatically have the right to form a government.
Instead, the emperor appointed the prime minister. Nor was the military legally
subordinate to civilian control. The military exploited this structural failure to the
fullest. Political freedoms necessary to sustain a democracy, such as freedom of
speech and assembly, scarcely existed.
MacArthur later said the new constitution was the single most important
accomplishment of the occupation of Japan, since it brought Japan freedoms and
privileges they had never known. The Japanese had never experienced political
freedom, equality between the sexes, freedom of speech, or Western style human
rights until May 3, 1947, when the new constitution came into effect. Basic to this
approach, the constitution declared that the Emperor was not a God but merely the
symbolic head of the state. It also established that Japan would not participate in war
for any reasons, and that the feudalistic hierarchy would be abolished. The new
constitution has directly affected Japanese people's lives ever since. In fact, in over
sixty years, it has never been amended. No other country in history has a constitution
made by an other nation. While it is still controversial whether GHQ created it or
Japanese government did, it is clear that MacArthur ordered, screened, and directed
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its drafting and implementation. It is also clear that this new constitution helped
dramatically to change Japan. The Japanese now enjoy freedom and democracy that
would have been unheard of before the occupation. One would also argue that the
constitution helped Japan to achieve economical and technological success and a high
standard of living.
Thus, establishing the new constitution was significant for both the United
States and Japan. MacArthur credited this accomplishment to the insistence that
checks and balances, the fundamental element of democracy, had been established in
the new political system. "If Japan proceeds firmly and wisely upon the course now
set, its way may well become the Asian way, leading to the ultimate goal of all
men—individual liberty and personal dignity—and history may finally point to the
Japanese Constitution as the Magna Charta of free Asia."''^'*

Revising Process

MacArthur ordered the Shidehara Cabinet to take charge of

revising Meiji Constitution. The occupiers did not force the Japanese to take the
American constitution but encouraged them to create their own. So the task was
initially left in the hands of the Japanese government. However, they took a long time
and did not include enough change. MacArthur found the proposed revisions
unsatisfactory and concluded that the government was incapable of proposing
revisions that would meet the Potsdam requirements.Thus, MacArthur took over
the initiative and directed GHQ's Government Section, under General Courtney
Whitney, to draft a constitution to guide the Japanese cabinet. MacArthur wanted to
include three key principles in the new constitution:
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l)The Emperor is at the head of the State. His succession is dynastic. His
duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and
responsible to the basic will of the people as provided therein. 2) War as a
sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an
instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own
security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for
its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will
ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency, will ever be conferred upon
any Japanese forces. 3) The feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of
peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lives of
those now existent. No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody
within itself any National or Civic power of Government. Pattern budget
after British system.'"^®
MacArthur urged extreme haste and secrecy, and the Government Section in fact
completed the entire document in just 2 weeks, presenting a draft to the Japanese on
February 19, 1946.
As MacArthur insisted, the draft reduced the emperor from a sovereign to a
mere symbol of the Japanese state and placed the Diet, as representatives of the will
of the people, at the center of national sovereignty. Equal rights were also granted to
women with regard to property, marriage, inheritance, and other aspects of family life.
The most innovative aspect of the constitution was Article 9, which declared the full
and complete disarmament of Japan and the renunciation of war. The Japanese
government accepted this document, and on March 6, 1946, MacArthur announced
that the Emperor and the government of Japan were presenting a new constitution to
the Japanese people. The constitution's origin was deliberately kept quiet, but the
awkward phrasing of the document, translated from the original one written in
English, showed it was thoroughly directed by GHQ.'"^^
Thus, unlike the initial policy of the United States, which indicated that the
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Japanese government should take the initiative in any reform process according to its
people's will and an inclination to intervene as little as possible, MacArthur
effectively used his authority in leading the Japanese government to establish their
new constitution. 148

Key Provisions of the New Constitution

MacArthur made it a priority to

liberate Japanese women from their state of slavery in a male-dominant social system.
Prior to the revision of constitution, he immediately revised the election law to give
women the right to vote on December 17, 1945. At the same time, the voting age was
lowered from 25 to 20. In Japan, men and women had never been equal. Concubinage
and family contract marriages, consigning wives to servility, had been lawful. Women
had been forbidden to own property and they had no economic, legal, or political
rights. Boys and girls were separated in education. Public school courses had been
segregated by sex—with the curriculum and texts pitched lower for girls—and there
had been no colleges for women. Adultery had been lawful for husbands but not for
wives. The new Diet had to face this form of sexism squarely in an early session.
Under the new constitution, contract marriage became illegal, and so did
concubinage. Marriage and divorce statutes were rewritten and liberalized to dictate
equality for both men and women: women gained equal rights with regard to property,
inheritance, and other aspects of family life.

Public high schools became

coeducational, and 26 women's universities opened. Women were for the first time
eligible to be elected for public office, and were to serve as social workers and police
officers in increasing numbers. Before MacArthur left Japan, two Diet committees
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would be chaired by women.As an immediate effect, the first free election held on
April 10, 1946, recorded high turnout rate—78.5% for men and 67% for women—and
elected 39 female members in the Lower House.MacArthur later said with
satisfaction, "Of all the reforms accomplished by the occupation in Japan, none was
•
more heartwarming to me than this
change in the status of women." 152

Supreme power was vested in the Diet, and three separate branches of
government were established. The prime minister, elected by the upper house of the
bicameral legislature, would serve for four years; if defeated on an issue, he could
either ask the lower house to choose a successor or call for new elections. MacArthur
saw this provision would provide a degree of stability in the government and said that
"no group within the Diet is going to question the administration of a prime minister
in an idle fashion if they are going to be forced to stand the expense of a new election
campaign as a result of their capriciousness." MacArthur regarded the provision for
amendment by national referendum as one of the significant factors of the new
constitution. It stated that "if two-thirds of the Japanese electors decide that a change
needs to be made, it goes into effect." The people themselves thus control their own
constitution and are, in the final analysis, the sovereigns in their own land. 153
Educational reform was another essential component of the new constitution.
The Board of Education Law, passed in July 1948, freed education from the direct
control of the Ministry of Education and vested authority in the hands of local school
boards, as was the case in the United States. Decentralization of education was
viewed as essential to permanent removal of the ability of the government to
indoctrinate Japanese students in the narrow form of Japanese nationalism that was
150
151
152
163
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believed to have sustained support for the war. Thus, early efforts also focused on
removal of all traces of emperor worship and militarism from the classrooms and
curriculum. Lacking funds and the time to replace textbooks, teachers and students
were initially directed to rip out or line through offending languages. Saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem, and bowing to the emperor's portrait were also
prohibited. Local occupation troops were dispatched to schools in their districts to
ascertain that these directives from GHQ were being carried out. GHQ also reformed
the elementary and secondary school system along U.S. standards and extended
compulsory, and free, education from 6 to 9 years. GHQ officials knew that the effect
of education would play out decades later. Thus, in order to make the democratization
reform long lasting, they concentrated on educating the next generation as they
wanted future Japanese to be.

Praise for the New Constitution

On the day the constitution came into

effect, celebratory ceremonies were held nationwide. One hundred thousand people
gathered in front of the imperial palace, and a Japanese brass band performing in the
plaza celebrated the occasion by playing The Stars and Stripes Forever. George
Atcheson, Jr., MacArthur's chief political adviser, referred to willingness of the
Japanese to adopt an American directed constitution as "the dawn of the age of
Japan's imitation of things American—not only of American machines but also
American ideas."'^^
At the completion of the draft, MacArthur proudly wrote, "It is undoubtedly
the most liberal constitution in history, having borrowed the best from the constitution
of many countries" and "the best standards of a truly parliamentary democracy." The
form of govenmient was "a combination of American executive system and the
154 Dower (1999), p.400.
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British pariiamentary one."'^^
In

his

New

Year's

remark of

1946,

MacArthur

mentioned

the

democratization by revising the constitution that "the removal of this national
enslavement means freedom for the people, but at the same time, it imposes upon
them the individual duty to think and to act each on his own initiative. It is necessary
for the masses of Japan to awaken to the fact that they now have the power to govern
and what is done must be done by themselves."'^^ Further, in the first New Year's
remark after adopting the new constitution, MacArthur congratulated the Japanese for
achieving the freedom;
Your new constitution is now in full effect, and there is increasing
evidence of a growing understanding of the great human ideals which it is
designed to serve. Implementing laws have reoriented the entire fabric of
your way of life to give emphasis to the increased responsibility, dignity and
opportunity which the individual now holds and enjoys. Government has
ceased to be totalitarian and has become representative, with its functions
decentralized to permit and encourage a maximum of individual thought and
initiative and judgment in the management of community affairs. Control of
every political segment has been shifted to permit the selection of a new
leadership of your free choice capable of advancing democratic growth...
Every Japanese citizen can now for the first time do what he wants, and
go where he wants, and say what he wants, within the liberal laws of his land.
This means that you can select your own work, and when you have
completed it you can choose your own method of relaxation and enjoyment,
and on your day of rest you can worship as you please, and always you can
criticize and express your views on the actions of your Government. This is
liberty...
The future therefore lies in your hands. If you remain true to the great
spiritual revolution which you have undergone, your nation will emerge and
go on—if you accept only its benefits without its obligations, it will wither
and go under...The way is long and hard and beset with difficulties and
dangers, but it is my hope and belief and prayer this New Year's Day that you
155 MacArthur, Reminiscences,, p.302.
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will not falter.
Joseph Keenan, chief prosecutor of the Tokyo Trial, sent a letter
congratulating MacArthur. "It seems to me," Keenan wrote, "to be a sound
combination of the American and British systems of government, leaving necessary
refinements to the development of the Japanese themselves."'^^ In fact, the new
constitution had borrowed many aspects from other countries' constitutions. Beate
Sirota Gordon, an Austrian who grew up in Tokyo, was educated in America and
worked for Time Magazine as a Japan specialist, came back to Japan after the war as a
member of the Government Section to draft the new constitution.'^^ She made
strenuous efforts to include equality of the sexes in the constitution of Japan. In an
assessment written in the 1990s, she revealed that she gained various ideas from the
constitutions of countries such as Sweden, Germany, and the Soviet Union especially
about matters on social welfare.Then she made sure that laws concerning marriage,
divorce, and adultery were to be revised as part of the program for equality between
the sexes in Japanese society and family structure. Thus, the old custom of contract
marriage was forbidden, concubinage was abolished, and Japanese women even
became able to ask for and receive maternity leave.
MacArthur noted there was much criticism of his speedy move to ensure the
enfranchisement of women in light of male sentiment and a perception that women
were too steeped in the tradition of subservience to their husbands to act with any
degree of political independence. However, in his reminiscences, MacArthur proudly
noted that he had enough support from important people to take such a step. President
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Truman, for example, said, "I am behind MacArthur a hundred percent, that I think
he's doing an excellent job and he can be absolutely certain I'll back him to the
finish." Secretary of State Byrnes proclaimed, "I think he is doing a magnificent job
and that all of us back here are and will continue to support his efforts to the limit of
our ability, we are all mighty proud of him." Herbert Hoover, commenting on
MacArthur, said "I think I have a realization, as perhaps no one else has, of the
difficulties with which you have been confronted and of the amazing service you have
been to the American people." Finally, historian Mary R. Beard effusively praised
MacArthur's efforts on behalf of women.
"There is something in General MacArthur's determination to
enfranchise the women of Japan indicative of his conception of the family as
the core or heart of society, and of woman as its prime guardian, which I
would almost have to go back to Confucius for comparison. That he should
associate the care and nutrition of the family with political democracy—and
do this in his own mind, not just by pressure from another mind—gives him a
standing in my mind—which is at the top of my judgment of statecraft. The
whole procedure in Japan is so superior in intelligence to the occupation in
Germany that General MacArthur's leadership shines with brilliant
illumination."'^'
Despite the doubters, Japanese women embraced. this reform. More than
13,000,000 women registered to vote for the first general election of April 10, 1946.
They were quick to take advantage of other aspects of their new status under the
constitution. This included finding jobs in professions from which they had been
previously excluded. For example, in the next five years, about two thousand women
became police officers.

The Controversial Article 9

Not only to Japan, but also to the world, the

"no-war" clause of Article 9 was the most striking feature of the new constitution. The
MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp.305-306.
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debate over whether Article 9 permitted or prohibited limited armament for the
purpose of self-defense has emerged every time Japan faced the possibility of
participating in any war, from the Korean War till the current war in Iraq. Article 9
reads as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.'®^
This provision clearly achieved the American goal of demobilization, but
disputes arose over whether Japan could rearm for the purpose of self-defense. The
origin of Article 9 has itself been fiercely debated. From MacArthur's note to the
Government Section, it was clear that he ordered its inclusion in the draft. However,
MacArthur later insisted that Prime Minister Shidehara proposed it to MacArthur.
Impressed by unexpected idea from Japanese side, MacArthur happily agreed. Later,
when MacArthur had to rearm Japan in the face of the growing threat of communism
and the outbreak of the Korean War, he asserted that Shidehara was the origin of
Article 9, thus avoiding the criticism for changing the policy. In his reminiscences,
MacArthur intentionally explained in his 1950 New Year's remarks to the Japanese
people the details of how he accepted Shidehara's idea, noting that he recommended
that, in case of need, a defense force be established consisting of ten divisions with
corresponding sea and air elements.
Should the course of world events require that all mankind stand to
arms in defense of human liberty and Japan comes within the orbit of
immediately threatened attack, then the Japanese, too, should mount the
maximum defensive power which their resources will permit. Article 9 is
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based upon the highest of moral ideals, but by no sophistry of reasoning can
it be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense
against unprovoked attack. It is a ringing affirmation by a people laid
prostrate by the sword, of faith in the ultimate triumph of international
morality and justice without resort to the sword.
Asahi Shimbun reported on August 14, 2005 that a correspondence dated
December 10, 1945 was found that was written by a former ambassador to Italy,
Toshio Shiratori (who was accused as a war criminal and sentenced to life in prison)
to Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Shiratori purportedly sent it from the Sugamo
Prison to propose the idea of renunciation of war to Prime Minister Shidehara.'^ If
Shidehara read this correspondence before he met MacArthur on January 24, 1946 to
discuss the draft, it is possible that MacArthur's account was right. Although a
detailed investigation has not been made yet, this report shows that the origin of
Article 9 and its interpretation are still a controversial matter and continues to get
Japanese people's attention even after sixty years.
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8. The Turning Point of the Occupation

Dawn of Communism and the Korean War

Once

GHQ

accomplished

demobilization smoothly, the priority of the occupation shifted from military matters
to political ones. MacArthur, as a missionary of democracy, strongly opposed
communism. And when the Red Scare gripped the United States, MacArthur also
strictly regulated Japanese communists. For example, he suspended the publishing of
the journal of the Japanese Communist Party, "Aka Hata," which meant red flag, and
also suppressed any kind of publication which expressed support for communism.
Facing the emergence of communist threat nearby, pressure began to build on
Japan to consider some level of rearmament, because Japan was vulnerable to an
enemy attack under the Peace Constitution which renounced war. MacArthur was
determined to shield Japan from neighboring threats and maintain it as a democratic
country. The United States needed a friendly power in the Far East because Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalists were steadily losing ground to Mao Zedong's communists in
China. GHQ gradually increased civilian and coastal police forces to handle domestic
security matters. By the time the war broke out in Korea in 1950, MacArthur decided
to allow Japan to rearm despite the "no-war" clause. Thus, on New Year's Day of
1950, he announced a new interpretation of Article 9, arguing that Japan needed to
rearm for self-defense to protect itself from the communist threat in Asia.'^^ In July
1950, Japan agreed to the U.S. request that they establish a "National Police Reserve"
of up to 75,000 men, which would function as a paramilitary force to fill the gap
created by the rapid dispatch of the U.S. occupation forces to Korea.Ironically,
MacArthur, who devoted all his effort in Japan's demilitarization in the initial period
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of occupation, now found himself overseeing the creation of a small army.
In 1952, the National Police Reserve was renamed "National Safety Forces."
Two years later, it became the "Self Defense Forces" with three branches: Ground,
Maritime, and Air. For years, the Self Defense Forces helped the U.S. defend Japan
against a Soviet threat during the Cold War. Beyond self defense, they have engaged
in disaster relief and United Nations peacekeeping efforts. However, the activities of
Self Defense Forces abroad have always been controversial among Japanese people:
should they participate in fighting as a member of international community, even in
regions where Japan was not involved, or simply stay home and guard the homeland?
Now that Japan faces a nuclear threat from North Korea, the question whether Self
Defense Forces can act preemptively has become a serious and urgent debate. Issues
over Japan's defense still remains problematic because of the vagueness of the
interpretation of Article 9.

Economic Recovery

Economically, too, the Korean War provided Japan with a

new start. MacArthur had made efforts in the first stage of the occupation to open
economic opportunities and spurred the creation of many new companies by breaking
up the family-owned "zaibatsu," such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda,
which controlled 75 percent of the country's commerce, raw materials, and transport.
But it was hard to see the effect immediately.'^^ Facing taxpayers restless with the
huge costs of the occupation, the U.S. government ultimately instructed MacArthur to
direct the Japanese government to undertake an economic stabilization program
designed by Joseph Dodge, a banker from Detroit. The U.S. attempted to ease the
burden of financial assist to Japan by encouraging the Japanese to promote economic
development and support themselves. The Dodge Plan, launched in 1949, was
16'' Manchester, p.539.
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followed by massive layoffs of government and industrial employees, increased taxes,
wage freezes, higher prices for rice, transportation, and other government-subsidized
goods and services, and reduced public services. This economic recovery program
had made significant progress by the mid-1950s. In three years, Japan's commerce
expanded rapidly and Japanese imports from the United States were cut in half.
Dodge also established a fixed exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar, undervaluing
the yen somewhat to stimulate exports by making Japanese manufactures cheaper on
the world market.In five years, national income had passed the prewar level
despite a wave of strikes, demonstrations, and sabotage against all these drastic
reform.
However, restrictions on Japan's external activities caused serious problems
in the expansion of Japan's international trade. Because of the absence of a peace
treaty, the Allies did not allow Japan to trade internationally, which undermined
efforts to achieve a self-supporting economy. The lack of trade with China was
particularly devastating. MacArthur argued that the world must allow Japan to trade.
"If we keep this economic blockade up, more and more will we have to support this
country. The job of occupation is to restore Japan's production to self-sufficiency. Our
problem is to keep Japan up."170
Ultimately, U.S. orders for military supplies to support the Korean War
provided the Japanese economy with the boost in external demand needed to
accelerate economic growth. During 1951 and 1952, U.S. military purchases of
Japanese products amounted to nearly $800 million per year. By the end of 1954,
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these purchases totaled about $3 billion.'^' This military spending benefited almost
every sector of the Japanese economy, from vehicle manufacturing to textiles.
Consequently, the United States saved Japanese economy not only by reconstructing
the base of economic structure but also by purchasing war supplies from Japan for the
war in Korea.

Toward the Peace Treaty

The

Korean

War

provided

an

impetus

to

Washington to move towards a peace treaty with Japan and accelerated the end of the
occupation. In fact, MacArthur and State Department had been calling for a peace
treaty since 1949 because they believed that the continued presence of the U.S. forces
throughout Japan served as an irritant rather than a force for stability. American public
opinion, which favored bringing the troops home, also encouraged them to move
forward on a treaty. As early as in March 1947, MacArthur mentioned in an interview
with foreign correspondents that "the time is now approaching when we must talk
peace with Japan."172 He insisted that the job of occupation was coming close to
completion, and democracy seemed established in Japan. He also favored having the
United Nations substitute supervision over Japan. Comparing it to the German
situation, MacArthur said "in Japan there is a functioning Government. But in
Germany the Government had to be built from the ground up and there is no
Government to sign the Peace Treaty... Over here there is no problem of what to do
with Japan."
In exchange for a peace treaty, the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff demanded that Japan accept rearmament and the U.S. bases indefinitely.
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida agreed to the U.S. demands to create a military force
Schaller, p.288.
MacArthur Papers, Article Appearing in Nippon Times. Tokyo, March 19, 1947
RG-25, Reel #960.
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of 300,000 to 350,000 men. Thus, in September 1951, the peace treaty and a separate
security treaty were signed in San Francisco. Representatives of 48 democratic
countries witnessed the event. In April 1952, with the enforcement of the treaty, Japan
regained its sovereignty.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The security treaty, officially named the

"Mutual Security Assistance Pact" has been the pillar of the U.S.-Japan relationship
ever since. It ensured continued U.S. access to bases in Japan in return for a pledge of
U.S. protection of Japan in the event Japan was attacked. In order to strengthen
Japan's ties to the West during the Cold War, the treaty of 1952 was revised in 1960,
and the U.S. and Japan signed the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security "
Under the new treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to maintain and develop
their capacities to resist armed attack in common and to assist each other in case of
armed attack on territories under Japanese administration. Significantly, these terms
stood in contradiction to Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution, which forbade
the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces." It also expressed the Japanese people's
renunciation of "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international
disputes."It was thus generally understood that Japan could not come to the
defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed
forces overseas.
The treaty also contained a status-of-forces agreement on the stationing of
United States forces in Japan, with specifics relating to the provision of facilities and
areas for their use and regarding the administration of Japanese citizens employed in

173 Wikipedia, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States
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the facilities. The Agreed Minutes to the treaty specified that the U.S. wanted to
consult the Japanese government prior to major changes in the American force
deployment in Japan or to the use of Japanese bases for combat operations other than
in defense of Japan itself. The treaty also covered the limits of the two countries'
jurisdictions over crimes committed in Japan by United States military personnel.
Having American bases all over Japan was always controversial in Japan,
even though the Japanese remained under U.S. protection. There were massive
demonstration and rioting by students and trade union members opposing the treaty in
the 1960s. Currently, there are 47,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan—Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps—and another 5,500 American civilians employed there
by the U.S. Department of Defense. Every incident of misconduct by U.S. servicemen,
such as raping Japanese women, has given rise to demand that the United States
diminish its presence in Japan.
Tensions have risen especially high in Okinawa, strategically crucial islands
in the Pacific, which the U.S. occupied until 1972. Okinawa has been a center of
debates over the American bases in Japan in past because the prefecture of Okinawa is
densely populated (it has 1,300,000 people) yet, with 27,000 U.S. military personnel,
is the biggest of all the American bases in Japan. Following a number of incidents
between Japanese residents and American servicemen, the residents of Okinawa have
long demanded moving the bases into a less densely populated area or diminishing
their size."'* The two sides in fact recently agreed to move 8,000 U.S. troops from
Okinawa to Guam.
As a result of the occupation and the security treaty, the United States
maintains the presence in Japan. It has worked effectively as a stabilizer of peace in
Wikipidia, the United States Forces Japan,
httpV/en.wildpedia.org/wikL/United_States_Forces_Japan
75

the East Asia, but, at the same time, it remains problematic because of continuing
conflicts between local residents and the U.S. military and its servicemen.

Truman Dismisses MacArthur The Korean War brought another change into the
occupation of Japan when President Harry Truman designated MacArthur
Commander of all United Nations forces in Korea. Then on April 11, 1951, shocking
news struck Japan: Truman had dismissed MacArthur from his position on grounds of
insubordination. MacArthur was removed from all his commands, including the
occupation of Japan.
The Mainichi newspaper described MacArthur's dismissal as "the greatest
shock since the end of the war."'^^ By this time, the Japanese had come to trust
MacArthur, and they thought they needed his guidance to recover completely. Thus,
people felt uncertain at the prospect of sudden independence from the General. Many
believed they were not simply ready. Even Asahi Shimbun, a liberal newspaper which
initially opposed Macarthur's policy and once suspended publication on orders of the
General, indicated doubts. In an editorial entitled "Lament for General MacArthur,"
published on the day after Truman's announcement, the paper stated;
We have lived with General MacArthur from the end of the war until
today... When the Japanese people faced the unprecedented situation of
defeat, and fell into the condition of exhaustion and despair, it was General
MacArthur who taught us the merits of democracy and pacifism and guided
us with kindness along this bright path. As if pleased with his own children
growing up, he took pleasure in the Japanese people, yesterday's enemy,
walking step by step toward democracy, and kept encouraging us.'^^
The whole country was filled with a combination of sorrow and gratitude
when the time came for MacArthur's departure on April 16. Prime Minister Yoshida
visited the General to thank him for his great contributions to Japan's reconstruction.
Manchester, p.782.
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Yoshida

made a statement on

a national

broadcast that "the General's

accomplishments in Japan were one of the marvels of history. It is he who has
salvaged our nation from post-surrender confusion and prostration, and steered the
country on the road to reconstruction. It is he who has firmly planted democracy in all
segments of our society. It is he who has paved the way for a peace settlement. No
wonder he is looked upon by all our people with the profoundest veneration and
affection. I have no words to convey the regret of our nation to see him leave."'
Even the Emperor paid a last visit to the embassy to share a farewell. Two million
Japanese people lined the route from the embassy to the airport, waving to MacArthur
and his family with American flags. Some wept. The speakers of both houses of the
Diet praised the General's righteousness, sympathetic understanding, and intelligent
guidance. Further, legislators discussed making the General an honorary citizen and
erecting a MacArthur Memorial, or a statue in Tokyo Bay.178
The Japanese people deeply respected and appreciated MacArthur's intense
devotion to the reconstruction of Japan. Indeed, MacArthur turned down a
million-dollar offer to publish a memoir because he wanted to devote all his energies
to Japan's recovery. During the six years of his mission in Japan, he never left Tokyo
except to attend the proclamation of independence ceremonies in Manila and Seoul
and for his meeting with Truman on Wake Island to discuss the strategy for the
Korean situation. Mainichi wrote:
"MacArthur dealt with Japanese people not as a conqueror but a
great reformer. He was a noble political missionary. What he gave us was not
material aid and democratic reform alone, but a new way of life, the freedom
and dignity of the individual... We shall continue to love and trust him as one
of the Americans who best understood Japan's position. We wanted his
further help in nurturing our green democracy to fruition. We wanted his
1'''' Manchester, p.782.
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leadership at least until a signed peace treaty had given us a send-off into the
world community."
Asahi followed that "We feel as if we had lost a kind and loving father."
Following his dismissal by the President, MacArthur was not even allowed to
attend the signing ceremony of the peace treaty in San Francisco on September 8,
1951, because he was no longer the supreme commander. But making a peace treaty
with Japan and ending the occupation would not have been possible so quickly
without MacArthur's tremendous contribution.
For all the outpouring of respect and gratitude on his departure, however,
MacArthur's statement at the hearings before the Senate on May 5, 1951 changed the
way the Japanese people felt about the General. Japanese nationals felt insulted by the
words of MacArthur expressing his view on the Japanese when he was asked if the
Japanese could be counted on to defend the freedoms they had gained under the
occupation:
Well, the German problem is a completely and entirely different one
from the Japanese problem. The German people were a mature race.
If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development in the
sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The
Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a
very tuitionaiy condition. Measured by the standards of modem civilization,
they would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of 45
years.
Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new
models, new ideas. You can implant basic concepts there. They were still
close enough to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts.
The German was quite as mature as we were. Whatever the German did
in dereliction of the standards of modem morality, the international standards,
he did deliberately. He didn't do it because of a lack of knowledge of the
world. He didn't do it because he stumbled into it to some extent as the
Japanese did. He did it as a considered policy in which he believed in his

Manchester, p.782.
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own military might, in which he believed that its application would be a
shortcut to the power and economic domination that he desired...
But the Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity. One of
the great mistakes that was made was to try to apply the same policies which
were so successful in Japan to Germany, where they were not quite so
successful, to say the least. They were working on a different level.
The Japanese people considered this statement insulting, and it effectively
brought end to "MacArthur fever" in Japan. Although MacArthur publicly ordered his
troops to treat the Japanese equally and with respect and to leam from them, the
testimony indicated that he saw the Japanese differently in his mind. The Japanese
people felt terribly disappointed by his private view, because they thought of him as a
father figure, not just a political figure. They felt ashamed about how thoroughly they
had trusted him and how submissively they had obeyed him, while he held such
negative views of the Japanese people. The shock in Japan was so great that the plan
for building his memorial was abandoned; no statue was ever built, and designation of
honorary citizen had never come to pass. Thus, although MacArthur had made a great
contribution to Japan's recovery from the war, he diminished the reputation and
admiration he had built in Japan for six years by his demeaning statement.

101

The U.S. occupation left an ambiguous legacy in Japan. However, Japan has
never amended what many perceive as an artificial constitute, and continue to struggle
with the interpretation of Article 9 At the same time, the Japanese do not know how
to deal with controversies over the U.S. military bases throughout Japan. Japan's
economy has become strong enough to compete with the U.S., but Japanese prime
ministers have always been loyal to American leaders and have tried to get along with
them, even if public opinion in Japan opposed them, for example for the recent
180 U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, May 1951, Part I,
esp. p.312.
181 Dower (1999), p.551.
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decision to send the Self-Defense troops to Iraq. Since the end of the war, the
Japanese have worked hard trying to catch up the American level of economy,
technology, modem culture, and standard of living. And the Japanese exceeded the
Americans at some sectors such as automobile industry, but Japan continues to look
up to the United States. Ultimately, Japan has remained MacArthur's children even
fifty years after achieving sovereignty.
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9. The Meaning of the Occupation

Why It Was Successful

The occupation of Japan was successful in large

part because of MacArthur's ability to read the mind and psyche of the Japanese
people. As he handled every situation he considered the psychology of the humiliated
and defeated people of Japan and made proper decisions, the most significant of
which was preserving the Emperor. Second, the occupation was a success because
MacArthur had the authority to make policies without interference. If he had to
consult other Allies, he might not have been able to enact his policies, no matter how
wise. Given a free hand to act, he accomplished all the initial aims smoothly and in a
short period. Third, the occupation went smoothly because of the foresight of the
Allies in utilizing the existing Japanese institutions of government and the Emperor.
They made effective use of existing authorities, which was impossible in Germany
because the Allies had to abolish all Nazis that led all the German authorities, and that
was why it took longer there. Finally, the unexpected cooperation of Japanese officials
and the general population, in response to the tolerant policies and the generous
activities of the GHQ, made the reconstruction process easier. Whether as nationals of
a vanquished country, or by their nature to obey authority, the Japanese submitted to
orders of the occupation forces.
The occupation succeeded because each role was distinguished clearly, and both
parties understood and played their roles properly—the Allies as rulers, and the
Japanese as the conquered. MacArthur's charismatic and strong authoritarian
personality provided precisely the ruler that the Japanese needed. In an address to the
House of Representatives of the United States on April 19, 1951, MacArthur showed
his respect toward the Japanese and praised their cooperation with the occupation
forces:
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The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest
reformation recorded in modem history. With a commendable will, eagerness
to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in
war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of
individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has
been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of
political morality, freedom of economic enterprise and social justice.
Politically, economically and socially Japan is now abreast of many free
nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be
counted, upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of
events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese
people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion
surrounding them from the outside, and checked communism within their
own frontiers without slightest slackening in their forward progress... I know
of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious—nor in which higher
hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the
human race. 182
MacArthur believed one of the things that made the occupation a success was
the public respect he gave them: "my insistence that we wanted to learn from the
Japanese as well as teach them. It had a great deal to do with restoring a sense of
dignity and purpose in their people, and as they regained self-respect and pride, they
approached an exchange of ideas with avidity and good will. This mutual respect
became the foundation of the basic esteem our two peoples came to have for one
another—and enabled the occupation to write a unique and warmly human chapter of
world history."'^^ Even if he held racially-biased and paternalistic attitudes toward
the Japanese privately, his official attitude appealed to and was appreciated by the
Japanese people. His public approach made them willingly cooperate with the
occupation forces.
It was also important that the Japanese appreciated the work of the
182 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, April 19, 1951, the Government
Printing Office, Washington D.C. p.4123.
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occupation authority, even though it came about as a result of losing the war. The
occupation forces benevolently helped the Japanese with supplies of food, clothes and
medicine when they were suffering from starvation, poverty and exhaustion. The new
constitution liberated Japanese people from their state as "subjects" of the empire.
Over time, the Japanese came to enjoy freedom in a civilized environment and a high
standard of living.

Why It Was Necessary

Occupying Japan was necessary for the United

States not only to punish the defeated country and secure control there but to establish
a friendly country and the presence of the U.S. military bases in the Pacific. By
occupying Japan and painting Japan with American colors, America successfully
transformed Japan from a menace into one of America's strongest allies. The alliance
with Japan gave the U.S. an expanded presence in the Pacific. As MacArthur insisted,
1S4
"the U.S. frontier lay in Asia." This became increasingly important as American
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated and the cold war took shape. The Korean
War, in particular, focused the American government's attention in the need to
establish Japan as a model of a democratic government and an outpost of American
influence in Asia.
For Japan, in hindsight, occupation was necessary. Being occupied was very
humiliating, but the Japanese had no option as a consequence of losing the war.
Beyond that, however, Japan needed help to recover. The Japanese needed to rebuild
the country from a circumstance of despair after the devastation of the war. They also
needed a new government and a new leader. In addition, Japan needed aid by the
Allies to feed its people at a time of serious hunger and poverty. If the Allies did
nothing but disarm the Japanese and punish war criminals, the whole nation of Japan
184 Manchester, p.566.
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might have collapsed. If MacArthur had not changed the old feudalistic social system,
it would have been impossible for Japan to be a respected member of international
community and one of its most industriali2ed countries, as they are now.
Although there remain several problems and controversies as a legacy of the
occupation, overall, the occupation of Japan was necessary for both the United States
and Japan, because it established the foundation of close ties between the two
countries, which now share the realm of superpowers and lead the world in areas of
economy and technology. For the Americans, the occupation of Japan was successful
because they changed Japan in the direction they wanted, by disarming, demobilizing,
and democratizing a formerly militaristic and imperial enemy. Within a few years
after its defeat, Japan had recovered from devastation and despair, established a
growing and successful economy, and become one of America's most cooperative
allies. America successfully established its presence in the Pacific, at least in part
through keeping a large number of military bases throughout Japan.

Looking Ahead

Fifty years have passed since the independence from the

occupation, and some problems persist. First, the interpretation of Article 9 in the new
constitution, which has always generated controversy, has resurfaced now, as Japan
faces the nuclear threat of North Korea. Whether or not Japan can take preemptive
action varies depending on how one interprets the clause which ambiguously declares
the renunciation of war. Secondly, the generation that experienced the occupation
blames America's influence for what they perceive as the absence of "Japanese
morality"

among

Japan's

young

people.

They

complain

that

America's

democratization program replaced the Japanese people's spirit with an American
standard. They criticize the younger generations for being individualistic, for showing
no respect to elders or parents, and for lacking a harmonious approach with others.
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However, it is incumbent on the Japanese people to adjust to the framework
established by the occupation. They must be able to teach younger generations if
something important if missing for them. The Japanese should not blame everything
on the occupation and American influence.
Now that over sixty years have passed, it is getting difficult for the World
War II generation to keep telling young people about the war and the experiences they
had in post war years. Many people who survived the war are now getting old and
dying, and young generations are not interested in the war and the occupation.
However, this is very important especially for the Japanese to keep telling the stories
to the next generations to let them leam how their country had changed by the war, by
the involvement of the United States, and how their country has grown with
Americans' guidance. The loss of World War 11 and the following occupation
represent the most significant turning point of modem Japanese history. This period is
significant for the United States as well, because this is when they established the
basis for the present U.S.-Japan relationship.
A Japanese movie "MacArthur's Children"

1 oc

portrays the life in a small

town on an island called Awajishima during the early period of occupation. Based on
a novel by Yu Aku, which was a fictional account of his own experience, the movie
starts with a scene in a classroom with children around ten years old. They are erasing
some parts of their textbooks using ink and brushes, which were usually used for
calligraphy, with the teacher's instruction. This scene represents the implementation
of the GHQ's order that all schools erase "inappropriate" phrases from the textbooks,
such as expressions praising the Emperor as a God, passages encouraging militaristic
or nationalistic ideas, or the ones opposing the Allies. On the day when the occupation

185 Masahiro Shinoda, MacArthur's Children, Japan Herald, 1984.
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troops landed on the island, children were excited to see "Yankees" coming, but adults
were anxious and fearful. A young female teacher tells her students "Our nation is
occupied now because we lost the war. But, please do not let your spirit get occupied
by them." And she starts teaching English with tears in her eyes. "I am a boy, I am an
American..." and the children repeat the phrase. It shows that children were just
enjoying the changes without knowing what was really going on, but adults, like this
teacher, had to deal with feelings of humiliation and sorrow of the defeat and with
their pride as Japanese.
People of the old generation who lived through this period have complex
feelings about the war and the following occupation. Yet they have not, in general,
discussed or expressed their thoughts in public. For the most part, as noted, the
conquered

Japanese

people

appreciated

the

humanitarian

activities

and

democratization programs by the occupation forces. At the same time, they wish they
could have maintained some aspects of their traditional Japanese morality instead of
replacing it totally with American values of freedom and individualism. The following
stories are personal experiences and thoughts about the occupation from three
individuals who experienced the war and the occupation. From my observation, the
people represent views common to their generation:
Izumi Mogi, 80 years old now, was 19 when General MacArthur and his
troops landed in Japan. She was Tokyo native, but was evacuated to an outskirt of the
city, avoiding the massive raids that struck the heart of Tokyo. She barely realized the
nation's defeat on the day of surrender, she recalls. Although she heard the Emperor
speaking to the people for the first time on the radio, and knew that Japan lost the war,
she could not believe it because she still saw B-29 airplanes flying above on the day
of surrender. She lost two brothers in the war; her house was burned by an air raid;
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food was scarce, and she just remembers the hardship of every single day. To her,
MacArthur's arrival seemed like something happening somewhere outside of her
world.
Izumi believes she learned to cooperate with and help others through the war
time experience. But she admits that she still wonders why all these innocent young
people, including her brothers, had to die. That feeling makes her visit Yasukuni
Shrine, a monumental shrine in Tokyo where the war dead are buried, every year to
mourn for them. She blames the Japanese government of the time for accepting every
order the Americans made during the occupation, although she understands they had
to. She did not like seeing Japanese people change their attitudes and values so
quickly or their following, or copying, the Americans. She thinks that Americans
occupied not only the land, but also the core of the people's spirit. As noted, she is
among many Japanese nationals who believe that the country lost traditional values of
Japanese morality, which embraced unity and harmony among people, when they
adopted the American values of democracy, freedom, and individualism. Now many
Japanese argue that Japan lost its nationality with the loss of the war. It was good to
adopt democracy and equality in society, Izumi says, but she wishes the Japanese
people could have maintained some traditional values and national characteristics.
Instead, she thinks, they were just totally Americanized. She insists this has had a bad
effect on the young generations who will control the future.
Indeed, the Japanese have acted exactly the way MacArthur predicted; the
Japanese followed the leader. They always needed authority to follow, and they would
do what majority did. The Emperor ordered his people to listen to MacArthur, so they
did. Putting so much focus on adopting a new, democratic social system following the
Izumi Mogi, Thoughts on the Postwar Experience, January, 2006, correspondence
to the writer.
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guidance by tlie occupation authorities, the Japanese people failed to preserve their
traditional way of thinking or values.
Shigeru Kobayashi, now 75 years old, is only a bit more sanguine in his
interpretation. He recalls that GHQ officers often came over to his school to inspect
and instruct his teachers. He believes that GHQ tried to pursue their aim to demobilize
and democratize Japan mainly by reforming education. They focused on teaching
young generations with new idea of democracy so that Japan would not become an
America's enemy again in the future. Now, Shigeru thinks, the Japanese people of his
generation can see the remains of the GHQ's education in current Japan. In that sense,
he thinks America's occupation policy was proved successful for Americans in
maintaining Japan as a favorable ally of the United States.
But like Izumi, Shigeru is pessimistic about the current situations in Japan.
He complains that people of younger generations have become more individualistic
and do not seem like to care about others or respect elderly people any more. He
insists that the Japanese way of thinking, which valued family and respected ancestors
and parents, worked well to keep the order of society as well as to hold family ties.
But GHQ saw that kind of social structure as feudalistic and they took it away in their
democratizing program. Thus, the Japanese ceased to value those ideas.
During the occupation period, the people of Japan had no rights to criticize or
oppose to the occupation policies as citizens of the defeated country. Even though
they achieved a constitutional freedom of expression, opposing activities or
publications were strictly controlled by the GHQ. They could not express their
dissatisfaction at the time. They had no choice but to obey everything the GHQ
ordered. In the long term, by and large, Shigeru thinks that majority of the Japanese
have appreciated the United States for bringing democracy to Japan and helping to
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recover from the aftermath of the war. However, he admits that, after sixty years have
passed, it is inevitable that dissatisfaction has emerged. He just wishes his generation
could reserve traditional aspects of Japanese morality for the next generation.
Ronald Vanderschaaf, a native of Iowa then 23 years old, was stationed in an
Army base called Camp Drake outside of Tokyo during the occupation. His duty at
Camp Drake was to handle office work dealing with the repatriation process of
Korean nationals in Japan. Although he had no direct involvement with MacArthur
during his mission, Ronald recalls the negative impression about the General as an
"American dictator in foreign land," who had a free hand to rule a defeated foreign
country. However, Ronald thinks MacArthur's attitudes were necessary and suited
well in the situation. Japan needed a strong dictator to follow in the period of despair.
When the Emperor lost his divine power, they needed someone to replace him. To fit
that spot, the leader of the occupation had to be a dictator, and MacArthur's strong
personality suited that spot perfectly.
Ronald appreciates the opportunity to live in Japan in that period. Because of
the Japanese atrocities during the war, he says, all Americans hated the Japanese, and
they believed all the Japanese were bad. However, by going to Japan, he found the
people of Japan "were just like us. We were the same human beings." Getting close to
his 80s now, he still thinks it was one of the most important things he did in his life.
While he was serving in Japan, he says, he also learned a lot from the Japanese and
their life styles, including how to appreciate the natural beauty of the seasons, flowers,
plants, and rocks, from Japanese ways of arranging those things with state of
simplicity. Thereafter, he became interested in different cultures and peoples. Now
after retiring as the principal of a middle school, he has been taking care of and
Shigeru Kobayashi, Thoughts on the Postwar Experience, ¥ehY\xaLry,20Q&,
correspondence to the writer.
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making friends with people from ail around the world—Mexico, Hungary, Romania,
South Africa and of course, Japan through his volunteer work of teaching English in a
little town Holland, Michigan.

1

Each individual who experienced the war and postwar days has his or her
own thoughts and opinions; some should be shared, some should be discussed, and
some should be reconsidered. Yet, as noted, many people who lived this period have
not expressed themselves well. Perhaps it was because the experience was so personal
or too sad to recall. However, it is necessary to share those thoughts and keep telling
the stories of their valuable experiences to the people of subsequent generations in
various ways—by telling, writing, or making films—to inform young people about one
of the most significant events of their country's history.

Ronald Vanderschaaf, Thoughts on the Postwar Experience, February, 2006,
correspondence to the writer.
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Conclusion
General MacArthur was wise to maintain the institution of the emperor. He
understood that the Japanese people needed a spiritual leader during a period of
traumatic change and despair. By his wise judgments, his mission to disarm and
democratize Japan was accomplished quickly and smoothly. MacArthur guided the
Japanese through reconstruction of the aftermath of the war providing them with food
and medicine. Within a few years, the United States achieved the transformation of a
former enemy into an ally. Some elements of the occupation remain controversial and
problematic, including the interpretation of Article 9 of the new constitution; the
move to rearm to respond to the threat of communism and the Korean War; the
decision of not punishing Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal; the issue of keeping
American bases throughout Japan, and the influence of American values on Japanese
culture. Nevertheless, MacArthur established the foundation for the reemergence of
Japan and the current U.S.-Japan relationship through his six years' work in Japan.
This is why MacArthur's occupation of Japan was significant.
MacArthur deserves credit for introducing the American values of democracy,
freedom and equality into Japan, and for establishing the base for the country to
become one of the most affluent and industrialized countries in the world. For
Japanese women, achieving opportunities to participate in the society with equal
rights with men was an especially significant event. It is hard to imagine what it
would have been like had the Allies not occupied and reformed Japan. If the
commander had not been MacArthur, Japan might also be very different today.
As noted, not all Japanese people would praise his work entirely. The elder
generations who experienced and remember the hardships of the wartime, still have
complex feelings for America's occupation; they witnessed the nation changed
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dramatically after the war. But it is the task of those who mourn the loss of traditional
values to keep telling subsequent generations of Japanese the stories of their hard
times—what they lost, what they gained, what the Allies changed—and teach young
generations what they want to maintain in Japanese values. Furthermore, it is up to the
Japanese government and policy intellectuals to adjust MacArthur's legacy if there is
something they think does not fit in the current world situation. Five decades later, it
is not appropriate to keep blaming every negative aspect of Japanese society on the
occupation by the United States.
Historian John Dower says "World War 11 did not really end for the Japanese
until 1952."'^^ In the sense that the Japanese are still debating over legacies of the
occupation continue to face accusations regarding their actions in the Pacific during
the war, their World War II might not be totally over yet. The Japanese government
has to tell people the truth about the history and admit everything Japanese military
leaders and troops did abroad during the war. The failure to do so is causing hostility
among the Chinese people against the Japanese even now. The Germans have been
honest about the Nazis' wrongdoings. The Japanese citizens should also know the
facts, honestly admit past mistakes, and show respect and sincere contrition to the
victims. That is the key to building better relationships in the future. Japan must leam
from history to improve attitudes and progress.
When considering the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese
cannot ignore MacArthur's accomplishments. He is one of the most significant
Americans in Japanese history. The rapid growth of Japan's economy and industry
might never have happened without MacArthur's guidance during the occupation.
Unfortunately, MacArthur ultimately diminished the respectful relationship he had

Dower (1999), p.25.
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with the Japanese, but, we should value his contributions to Japan's reconstruction
and for building the base of the firm relationship between the two big countries in
present world. The latter contribution is particularly noteworthy following a brutal
war in which peoples of both sides demeaned and hated each other. MacArthur's work
during the occupation helped to remove that sentiment from the people's minds,
helped the Japanese recover, and liberated them from a feudalistic social system.
In sum, the occupation of Japan and MacArthur's contribution were
significant in the history of both Japan and the United States, and it remains
meaningful to the present day, as it established the foundation of the U.S.-Japan
relationship and for Japan's role as a leader of the world's economy and guardian of
security in the Pacific. Sixty years have passed since the end of the war, and the
legacy of the occupation is still alive. Some aspects remain controversial, some should
be adjusted to the current situation. It is important now to reconsider the meaning of
the occupation. MacArthur's legacy includes Japan's conversion from a militaristic
monarchy to a stable democracy, its mixed form of parliamentary democracy, the
liberation of Japanese women, and the peace constitution. MacArthur also laid the
foundation for Japan's phenomenal post-war economic growth and its close
relationship with the United States. Historians have pointed to the irony of a
right-wing military commander with a decidedly imperial style bringing democracy
and the liberation of women to Japan. Perhaps as much as anything else, however, it
was his imperial bearing that enabled him to effect such changes. In the end, he was
the right man for the job.

93

BIBLIOGRAPHY
CIA, The World Factbook
http://www.cia.gov/cia/pubIications/factbook/geos/ja.htmI
Cohen, Theodore, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (New
York, The Free Press, 1987)
Congressional Record, House of Representatives, April 19, 1951 (Washington D.C.,
The U.S. Government Printing Office)
, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East,
May 1951, Part I, esp. 312p. (Washington D.C., The U.S. Government
Printing Office)
Department of States, Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, Far Eastern Series
17 (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.267, 1946)
, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945-46
(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.2783, 1947)
Department of War, Office of the Adjutant General, Machine Records Branch,
Strength of the Army (Washington, D.C., December 1, 1945)
Dobbins, James, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
(California, Rand, 2003), coeditors: John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G
Jones, Rollie Lai, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, Anga Timilsina
Dower, John W, Embracing Defeat; Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York,
W.W. Norton & Company, 1999)
, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War ( New York,
Pantheon Books, 1986)
Fellers, Bonner, Answer to Japan, Bonner F. Fellers papers (Hoover Institution of War
and Peace, Stanford University)
, Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan, with
appendices and minutes of the Conference on Psychological Warfare
Against Japan (Manila, 1945, Hoover Institution of War and Peace,
Stanford University)
Grew, Joseph C., Ten Years in Japan (New York, Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1944)
Harvey, Robert, American Shogun: General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the
Drama of Modern Japan (New York, The Overlook Press, 2006)
MacArthur, Douglas, Reminiscences, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1964)
, Reports of General MacArthur: Vol. The Campaigns of
MacArthur in the Pacific, Vol.1: Supplement: MacArthur in Japan: The
94

Occupation, Military Phase, Vol.11: Japanese Operations in the Southwest
Pacific Area (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966}
MacArthur Papers, RG-5, 9, 25, (Norfolk, Virginia, The MacArthur Memorial)
Manchester, William, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (New York,
A Laurel Book, 1978)
Marquis Matsudaira,Yasumasa, The Japanese Emperor and The War, Reports of
MacArthur, Vol.11, Part II, Appendix (Washington D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1966)
Mears, Helen, Mirror for Americans: JAPAN (Boston,Houghton Mifflin Company
1948)
Nichi Bei Times
Nippon Times
Schaller, Michael, The American Occupation of Japan (New York; Oxford University
Press, 1985)
The Stars and Stripes
Whan, Jr., Vorin E., A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the
Army Douglas MacArthur (New York, Frederick A. Praeeer, Inc., 1965)
Wikipidia, GARIOA
http;//ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/GARIOA
Imperial Rescript on Surrender, August 15, 1945.
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Imperial_Rescript_on_Surrender
, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_MutuaLCooperation_and_Security_betwee
n_the_United_States_and_Japan

i United States Forces Japan
http;//en. wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Japan

Japanese Sources:
Asahi Shimbun
Doi, Takako and Gordon, Beate Sirota, Secret Stories behind Establishing Equal
Rights for the both Sexes (Tokyo, Iwanami, 1996)
Nishi, Toshio, Kuni Yaburete MacArthur (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, Inc., 2005)
Sodei, Rinjiro, Dear General MacArthur (Boston, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2001)
Sodei, Rinjiro, MacArthur's 2000 Days (Tokyo, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1976)
Shinoda, Masahiro, MacArthur's Children (Japan Herald, 1984)
Tokyo Shimbun
Tokyo Yomiuri
Yomiuri Hochi Shimbun

95

